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ABSTRACT
We provide strong evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market, and analyze
its sources. Using Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) data, we find that, conditional on
controls for the price of Medigap, medical expenditures for senior citizens with Medigap coverage
are,  on  average,  about  $4,000  less  than  for  those  without.  But,  if  we  condition  on  health,
expenditures for seniors on Medigap are about $2,000 more. These two findings can only be
reconciled if those with less health expenditure risk are more likely to purchase Medigap, implying
advantageous selection. By combining the MCBS and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we
investigate the sources of this advantageous selection. These include income, education, longevity
expectations and financial planing horizons, as well as cognitive ability. Once we condition on all
these factors, seniors with higher expected medical expenditure are indeed more likely to purchase
Medigap. Surprisingly, risk preferences do not appear to be a source of advantageous selection. But
cognitive ability emerges as a particularly important factor, consistent with a view that many senior
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Asymmetric information is central to modern economic models of insurance pioneered by Ar-
row (1963) and Pauly (1974). The classic equilibrium models developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and Wilson (1977) assume that potential insurance buyers have one-dimensional private
information regarding their risk type. They choose from a menu of contracts, specifying the price
and amount of coverage, the one best suited to their type. These simple models predict a positive
correlation between insurance coverage and ex post realizations of loss. The reason is simply ex
ante adverse selection: the “bad risks” (i.e., those relatively likely to suﬀer a loss) have an incentive
to buy more insurance. Allowing for ex post moral hazard only strengthens the positive correla-
tion between coverage and ex post loss. This “positive correlation property” of classic asymmetric
information models (see Chiappori and Salani´ e 2000) forms the basis for empirical tests of asym-
metric information in several recent papers.1 Interestingly, these papers, which examine a variety
of important insurance markets, generally fail to ﬁnd empirical support for the positive correlation
property (see Section 2 for details).
Indeed, it is often found that, conditional on pricing information, those who buy more insurance
tend to be relatively good risks – a phenomenon that has been called “advantageous selection.”
Some researchers have speculated that multi-dimensional private information can explain this phe-
nomenon.2 For example, de Meza and Webb (2001), postulate that individuals have private in-
formation about both their risk type and their risk aversion. Selection based on risk aversion is
advantageous if: (1) the more risk averse buy more insurance coverage; and (2) the more risk
averse have lower risks. Then, failure to condition on risk aversion may mask the expected positive
correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk that exists in one-dimensional models.3 Of
course, while the prior literature has emphasized risk aversion as the prime suspect,4 it is not the
only potential source of advantageous selection. More generally, selection based on any private in-
formation item γ is advantageous if γ is positively correlated with insurance coverage but negatively
1Chiappori, Jullien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (2005) generalize this empirical prediction to a large class of models where
the insurance market is competitive and the risk aversion of the insured is public knowledge, assuming a suitably
modiﬁed notion of positive correlation between risk occurrence and coverage. Chiappori (2000) provides a useful
survey of the theoretical and empirical literature up to that date.
2See, e.g., the concluding discussions in Chiappori and Salani´ e (2001) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2004).
3The ﬁrst verbal description of this phenomenon in the economics literature appears to be Hemenway (1990, 1992),
who used the term “propitious selection.”
4The notable exception is Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) who also found advantageous selection on wealth in
their study of the long term care insurance market.
1correlated with risk (see Section 3 for details). Furthermore, γ need not be private information,
but could also include observables that insurers are not permitted to use in setting prices.
While prior work has speculated that advantageous selection based on unobservables accounts
for the empirical failure of the “positive correlation property,” it has not provided direct evidence
to support this conjecture.5 Nor has it provided direct evidence on the source (or sources) of
advantageous selection, be it risk aversion and/or something else.
In this paper, we study the advantageous selection phenomenon using data from the Medicare
supplemental or “Medigap” insurance market. A “Medigap” policy is health insurance sold by
a private insurer to ﬁll “gaps” in coverage of the basic Medicare plan (e.g. co-pays, prescription
drugs).6 We show that the Medigap market is characterized by advantageous selection: conditional
on the determinants of price, those who purchase supplemental insurance tend to be healthier
than those who do not. More importantly, we go beyond prior research to investigate several
potential sources of this advantageous selection. We ﬁnd that these sources include standard
factors such as income, education, longevity expectations and ﬁnancial planing horizons, as well
as less conventionally modelled variables including cognitive ability and ﬁnancial numeracy. Once
we condition on all these factors, individuals with higher expected medical expenditures are indeed
more likely to purchase Medigap insurance.
Interestingly, while the theoretical literature has emphasized risk preferences as a potential
source of advantageous selection, we ﬁnd little evidence in support of that hypothesis. Direct
measures of risk tolerance are signiﬁcant predictors of Medigap insurance purchase but do not
contribute much to advantageous selection.7 Rather, cognitive ability and income emerge as far
more important sources of advantageous selection.
Our ﬁnding that cognitive ability is an important source of advantageous selection is consistent
with earlier literature showing that many senior citizens have diﬃculty understanding Medicare
and Medigap rules (see, e.g., Caﬀerata (1984), McCall et al. (1986), Davidson et al. (1992), Harris
and Keane (1999)). In particular, it appears that many fail to understand Medicare cost sharing
requirements. There is also a literature showing that many consumers have diﬃculty understanding
5Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), which we discuss in more detail in Section 2, use preventive health care as a
proxy for risk preference, and ﬁnd indirect evidence of advantageous selection based on risk preference.
6See Section 4 for more details about the Medicare program and the Medigap insurance market.
7In this regard, our results are consistent with Cohen and Einav (2005) who estimate a structural model of
automobile insurance deductible choice, and use it to infer both accident risk and risk aversion. They ﬁnd risk type is
positively correlated with risk aversion, contrary to what is required for risk aversion to be a source of advantageous
selection. The evidence in Cohen and Einav is, however, indirect, as neither risk or risk aversion are directly measured.
2health insurance plans more generally. See, e.g., Gibbs et al. (1996), Isaacs (1996), Tumlinson et
al. (1997), Cunningham et al. (2001). Our results imply that senior citizens with relatively low
cognitive ability also tend to have relatively high health expenditure risk and low probability of
buying Medigap (even conditional on income and price). This may suggest a role for educational
interventions to facilitate choice (see, e.g., Harris (2002)).
The Medigap market is ideal for studying advantageous selection because the coverage and
pricing of Medigap policies are highly regulated by the U.S. government. First, in all but three
States, insurance companies can only sell ten standardized Medigap policies. Second, within the
six month Medigap open enrollment period – which starts when an individual is both older than 65
and enrolled in Medicare Part B – an insurer cannot deny Medigap coverage, or place conditions
on a policy, or charge more for pre-existing health conditions. Indeed Robst (2001) ﬁnds that
the average Medigap premium an individual faces depends almost exclusively on his/her State of
residence, age and gender. Thus, we do not need to worry that the sources of advantageous selection
we have identiﬁed (e.g., income, cognition, etc.) might inﬂuence prices because they are potentially
observed by insurers.8
Another key feature of the Medigap market is that it is intimately linked to the Medicare
program, so one can obtain detailed administrative data on diagnoses, treatments and expenditures.
We exploit this link and use in our analysis the Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS), which
combines survey data and Medicare administrative records. The Medicare administrative data on
medical expenditure provide perhaps the most accurate measure of health expenditure risk of any
commonly available data set. Though the MCBS itself does not contain detailed information about
risk aversion and other potential sources of advantageous selection, the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), a longitudinal data set covering a large sample of the Medicare eligible population,
has information about such variables. Our empirical strategy uses the MCBS and HRS jointly to
examine the sources of advantageous selection.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature; Section
3 presents a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the idea of advantageous selection; Section
4 provides some detailed background about Medicare and the Medigap insurance market; Section
5 describes the MCBS and HRS data sets used in our analysis; Section 6 provides direct and
indirect evidence of advantageous selection using the MCBS data; Section 7 examines the sources
8As shown in the theoretical analysis of Julien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (2005), the non-competitiveness of the Medigap
insurance market is a necessary condition for the multi-dimensional private information to manifest itself in terms of
a non-positive correlation between ex post risk and coverage.
3of advantageous selection by combining the MCBS and HRS, and presents our main results; Section
8 presents several robustness checks on our results; Section 9 brieﬂy discusses the conditions under
which our estimates also provide a lower bound on the magnitude of moral hazard (or price eﬀect)
of Medigap insurance coverage; and ﬁnally, Section 10 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Empirical Tests for the Presence of Asymmetric Information. Standard equilibrium mod-
els of insurance markets predict a positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk
(Chiappori, Jullien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e 2005). This positive correlation property has been tested in
several recent studies, for a variety of markets. Cawley and Philipson (1999) use four data sources
including the HRS and the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) to test
for positive correlation between self-perceived or objective mortality risk and the probability of
purchasing life insurance. To the contrary, they ﬁnd the mortality rate of U.S. males who purchase
life insurance is below that of the uninsured, even when controlling for many factors such as income
that may be correlated with life expectancy.
The evidence from the auto insurance market is more ambiguous. Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000)
show that accident rates are lower for young French drivers who choose comprehensive automo-
bile insurance than for those opting for the legal minimum coverage, even after controlling for
observable characteristics known to automobile insurers (though the diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant). On the other hand, there is a literature that supports the presence of adverse selec-
tion in the choice of contractual forms, including deductibles and co-payments etc. For example,
Puelz and Snow (1994) argued, in the context of automobile collision insurance, that in an adverse
selection equilibrium, individuals with lower risk will choose a contract with a higher deductible,
and contracts with higher deductibles should be associated with lower average prices for coverage.
They ﬁnd evidence in support of each of these predictions using individual data from an automobile
insurer in Georgia.9 Similarly, Cohen (2005), using data from Israel, ﬁnds that new auto insurance
customers choosing a low deductible tend to have more accidents, leading to higher total losses to
the insurer.10
9However, see Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) and Dionne, Gouri´ eroux and Vanasse (2001) for some criticisms of
the Puelz and Snow study.
10Moreover, she ﬁnds this correlation exists among experienced new customers (those with 3 or more years of
driving experience), but not among inexperienced new customers (those with little or no driving experience). This
suggests learning is involved in the origin of private information.
4Cardon and Hendel (2001) use a diﬀerent approach to test for information asymmetries in
health insurance markets. They estimate a structural model of health insurance and health care
choices using data on single individuals from the National Medical Expenditure Survey. They
ﬁnd that estimated price and income elasticities, as well as demographic diﬀerences, can explain
the expenditure gap between the insured and the uninsured. Thus they judge the role of adverse
selection to be economically insigniﬁcant.11
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) use a unique individual level data set on annuities from the
U.K. and ﬁnd systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such
as the timing of payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitants’ estate. But they do
not ﬁnd evidence of substantive mortality diﬀerences by annuity size.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Our paper is most closely related to recent work by Finkel-
stein and McGarry (2006), who study selection based on multi-dimensional private information in
the long-term care (LTC) insurance market. Using the AHEAD data they ﬁnd a negative (though
statistically insigniﬁcant) correlation between LTC coverage in 1995 and use of nursing home care
in the period between 1995-2000, even after controlling for insurers’ assessment of a person’s risk
type - (weakly) suggesting the presence of advantageous selection. However, the 1995 AHEAD also
contains the subjective probability assessment “What do you think are the chances that you will
move to a nursing home in the next ﬁve years?” This variable is known by the insured and the
econometrician, but unobserved by the insurer, so it cannot be used in setting prices. Finkelstein
and McGarry (2006) ﬁnd this subjective risk assessment is positively correlated with both LTC
coverage and nursing home use in 1995-2000, even after controlling for insurers’ risk assessment,
suggesting the presence of adverse selection based on private information about risk type.12
What makes the Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) paper similar to ours is that they develop
a proxy for risk aversion, using information on whether respondents undertake various types of
preventive health care.13 They ﬁnd that people who are more risk averse by this measure are
11In their structural model, Cardon and Hendel (2001) assume that individuals have identical preferences.
12Recently, Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) proposed such use of characteristics of insurance buyers that are ob-
servable to the econometrician but not used by insurers in setting prices as a general strategy to test for asymmetric
information in insurance markets. If one can ﬁnd one or more such observables that are correlated with both the
insurance coverage and the risk occurrence, then one rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric information.
13The potential preventive health care measures they include are: whether the individual had a ﬂu shot, had a
blood test for cholesterol, checked her breast for lumps monthly, had a mammogram or breast x-ray, had a Pap smear
and had a prostate screen.
5both more likely to own LTC insurance and less likely to enter a nursing home – consistent with
advantageous selection based on risk aversion.
To summarize, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) ﬁnd that the overall correlation between LTC
insurance coverage and use of long-term care is negative but insigniﬁcant. They conclude that
multidimensional private information explains this result, since they ﬁnd adverse selection based
on the subjective risk assessment and advantageous selection based on their proxy for risk aversion,
and it seems these two factors may roughly cancel on net.
Our paper complements and extends Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) in several ways. First,
we examine a much larger insurance market, the Medigap market. More than half the over age 65
respondents in our HRS data purchased a Medigap policy. In contrast, the LTC insurance market is
very small (only about 10 percent of the elderly in the AHEAD had LTC insurance). Besides being
a very large and important market, we feel the Medigap market has several important advantages
for studying asymmetric information.
First, studying the Medigap market allows us to employ a diﬀerent method of inference about
the presence of advantageous selection. The key point is that regulation eﬀectively precludes price
discrimination on the basis of health risk. Thus, we can consider the eﬀect on the estimated
relationship between Medigap coverage and ex-post risk of conditioning on a rich set of health
information that is, by law, private to consumers. This gives us a much richer set of “private” risk
measures than the single subjective risk assessment used by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
Second, we examine not just one possible source of advantageous selection (i.e., risk aversion),
but several other potential sources as well. For this purpose, we use HRS information on other
objects of special theoretical interest such as longevity expectations, planning horizons, cognition
and ﬁnancial numeracy, etc. Third, rather than using behavioral proxies for risk aversion, we
exploit the direct measures of risk aversion contained in the HRS.
Finally, the Medigap market has the key virtue that ex post health expenditure risk (i.e.,
health expenditure itself) can be quite accurately measured using the MCBS. This dataset contains
comprehensive health expenditure data for a large sample of the entire Medicare population, from
age 65 until death. It also contains very extensive health measures, enabling one to form accurate
measures of ex post expenditure conditional on age and health.14
14In contrast, available LTC data sets do not contain large samples of respondents at the oldest ages, when many
episodes of nursing home care occur. Since many nursing home admissions occur in the few years/months before
death, the best measure of ex post risk for LTC is whether one eventually uses nursing home care prior to death, not
whether one uses it over some particular time period. Since many of the respondents in the AHEAD data used by
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) are still alive, their measure of ex post risk - whether the respondent used a nursing
6Literature on Adverse Selection in the Medigap Market. Our paper is also related to a
literature that looks for evidence of adverse selection in the Medigap market. Wolfe and Goddeeris
(1991) examine this issue using data from the Retirement History Survey, a longitudinal survey of
recent retirees conducted by Social Security Administration between 1969 and 1979. They used self
reported health and self reported expenditure measures, the latter including total medical bills for
hospital, physician and prescription expenditures, including any amount paid by insurance. They
found that respondents with better self-reported health were more likely to purchase supplemental
private insurance. But those with private insurance also incurred higher expenditures on hospital
stays, physician care and prescription drugs (though this diﬀerence was statistically insigniﬁcant).
Hurd and McGarry (1997) used the ﬁrst wave of AHEAD to examine how health insurance
inﬂuences the use of health care services by the elderly. They found that those with more compre-
hensive insurance tend to use more health care services (as measured by number of hospital and
doctor visits), controlling for self-reported health indicators.15 However, they also found little rela-
tionship between observable health measures and either the propensity to hold or purchase health
insurance, indicating little importance of adverse selection.
Khandker and McCormack (1996) estimated multinomial logit models of insurance choice and
found that individuals reporting better health were signiﬁcantly more likely to enroll in private
supplemental plans. This is consistent with advantageous selection, although self reported health
does not necessarily correspond to ex post expenditure.
In contrast, Ettner (1997), using MCBS 1991, found little evidence of variation in the probability
of purchasing private insurance by health status.16 She also found that Medicare beneﬁciaries
with supplemental policies had higher total Medicare and physician expenditures than those with
employer-provided policies, even after controlling for observable diﬀerences. She interprets this as
evidence of adverse selection under the assumption that selection into employer provided coverage
is random. We view this assumption as implausible. Moreover, those with employer-sponsored
health insurance may be subject to diﬀerent rules regarding whether Medicare is the primary payer
for various services. Such issues are important because Ettner (1997) examined only Medicare
reimbursed expenditure.
home between 1995 and 2000 – may be relatively incomplete. The AHEAD sample represents the population born
before 1924, and who were at least 76 by the year 2000; but many are quite far from their time of death. According
to life-table estimates, those alive at age 75 in 2000, had on average 11.4 more years to live (Vital Statistics, 2004).
15They did not report results without controlling for measured health.
16Lillard and Rogowski (1995), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), also found little evidence of
adverse selection for supplemental insurance.
7Finally, Khandker and McCormack (1999), using MCBS 1991 and 1993, found that those with
supplemental private insurance tended to incur higher levels of Medicare reimbursed spending,
particularly Part B services. However, because Medigap plans cover Medicare co-pays, they reduce
the out-of-pocket price of Medicare covered services. Thus, it is possible that those with Medigap
incur higher Medicare reimbursed expenditures, while nonetheless incurring less total health care
spending. (Indeed, Section 6.1 provides evidence consistent with this view.) Conversely, those
with basic Medicare alone may incur more total expenditures, despite smaller Medicare reimbursed
expenditures, because they spend more out of pocket. Thus, we would argue that, to study adverse
selection in Medigap, a better measure of health expenditure risk is total medical expenditure, not
just expenditure reimbursed by Medicare or Medigap.17
3 Multi-dimensional Private Information and Advantageous Se-
lection
It is now well understood that, given multi-dimensional private information, the correlation
between ex post risk realizations and coverage may be negative, zero, or positive - see, Henmenway
(1990, 1992), de Meza and Webb (2001), Araujo and Moreira (2001) and Jullien, Salani´ e and
Salani´ e (2005). These papers all focus on private information about risk aversion as the source of
advantageous selection. In this section, we ﬁrst follow the literature and illustrate this idea using
risk aversion in a partial equilibrium example; then, anticipating our main empirical focus, we
expand our deﬁnition of advantageous selection to include selection based on other types of private
information.
Risk Aversion as the Source of Advantageous Selection Consider an individual over age






where γ is the relative risk aversion parameter. She has wealth Y > 0, and faces a risk of incurring
a health expenditure shock (over and above what is covered by basic Medicare) of L > 0 with
17Unfortunately, the waves of the MCBS data used in Khandker and McCormack’s (1999) analysis only contained
Medicare claim data, but did not contain information about total health cost, including beneﬁciary out-of-pocket
cost as well as expenses paid by supplementary insurers. We are grateful to Tami Swenson for the clariﬁcation on
these data issues.
8probability p ∈ [0,1].18 For simplicity, assume that the individual can choose to purchase Medigap
insurance at a premium m that will reduce the out-of-pocket expenditure to 0. Her expected utilities
from buying and not buying Medigap are respectively given by
VB (p,γ) = u(Y − m) + e
VN (p,γ) = pu(Y − L) + (1 − p)u(Y ).
where e is a ﬁxed cost of buying Medigap (i.e., the time and psychic costs of applying), that has
a logistic distribution in the population, independent of p and γ. The probability the individual
purchases Medigap is then given by the logit expression:
Q(p,γ) =
exp[VB (p,γ)]
exp[VB (p,γ)] + exp[VN (p,γ)]
(1)
Simple algebra shows that Q(p,γ) is increasing in p and γ.19 That is, more risky and more risk
averse individuals are more likely to purchase Medigap.
Now suppose that in the population there is a joint distribution over individuals’ private types
(p,γ) given by F, and let the CDF of risk aversion conditional on risk type p be Fγ|p (·|·). If we
do not control for risk aversion γ and look only at the relationship between risk-type p and the




If p and γ are negatively correlated, then ˜ Q(p) may or may not increase in p.
We can also compare the average health shock risk p for those with and without Medigap






where the denominator is the measure of individuals who purchase Medigap, and the numerator is
the expected number of health shocks that occur to those who purchase Medigap. Similarly, the
18We assume away the price eﬀect, also called “moral hazard” as in Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999), by assuming
the expenditure level L does not depend on health insurance status.
19Note that, the sign of ∂Q/∂p is the same as the signs of ∂ (VB − VN)/∂p, which is given by:
∂ (VB − VN)
∂p
= u(Y ) − u(Y − L) > 0.
To show that Q(p,γ) is increasing in γ, it is easier to use the fact that, for any γ
0 > γ, there exists a strictly concave
and increasing function v (·) such that u(y;γ
0) ≡ v (u(y;γ)).
9average risk among those without Medigap is
AN =
R
[1 − Q(p,γ)]pdF (p,γ) R
[1 − Q(p,γ)]dF (p,γ)
. (4)
Chiappori and Salani´ e’s (2000) test for asymmetric information is a test of whether AB > AN.
However, if p and γ are negatively correlated, it is possible that AB ≤ AN despite the presence of
asymmetric information.
The above example is merely illustrative, as we only analyze individuals’ insurance purchase
decisions assuming a particular equilibrium (i.e., a particular menu of insurance options), and do
not analyze the full equilibrium in which insurance companies may compete by oﬀering diﬀerent
insurance contracts.20 However, this simple example captures the idea that, when individuals diﬀer
in both risk type and risk aversion, it is possible that those who purchase more coverage may on
average be lower risk (if there is negative correlation between risk aversion and risk type).
Sources of Advantageous Selection: General Discussion The above illustration showed
how private information about risk aversion can be a source of advantageous selection into insurance.
We will now generalize this concept. For this purpose, we again let p denote the probability of
a health expenditure shock. But we now interpret γ as any private information that may aﬀect
agents’ probability of purchasing Medigap Q(p,γ). Now instead of deriving Q(p,γ) explicitly as we
did when γ was interpreted as risk aversion, we take the probability of Medigap purchase Q(p,γ)
as the reduced-form entity of focus. Viewed from this perspective, we state the general properties
for a private information item γ to act as a source of advantageous selection as follows:
Property 1: γ is positively correlated with insurance coverage, i.e., Q(p,γ) is increasing in γ;
Property 2: γ is negatively correlated with risk p.
Under these two conditions, the average probability of insurance purchase for a given risk type
p, namely ˜ Q(p) as deﬁned in (2), may not be monotonic in p; and the ranking of AB and AN,
deﬁned respectively by (3) and (4), can go either way. It is important to emphasize the assumed
negative correlation between γ and risk p may arise either exogenously or endogenously (in the
20We refer the reader to Julien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (2005) for a formal equilibrium analysis of the case when the
insurance market is not competitive, and Chiappori, Julien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (2005) for the case when the market
is competitive. The latter paper shows that, when the insurance market is competitive in the sense that proﬁts
are not increasing in coverage, a suitably modiﬁed version of the positive correlation property still holds even with
multi-dimensional private information.
10sense that the would-be-insured with a higher γ may take an action to reduce p). For our purpose
this distinction is unimportant.21
In our empirical analysis, we ﬁrst provide, in Section 6, evidence that is akin to “AB < AN,”
that is, the health risk occurrence for those with Medigap insurance is lower than those without
Medigap insurance, suggesting the existence of advantageous selection. Then in Section 7, we
examine the sources of advantageous selection, that is, we look for elements of γ that may account
for the earlier ﬁnding that AB < AN.
4 Background on Medicare and Medigap
4.1 Medicare
Medicare is the primary health insurance program for most seniors in the United States. All
Americans age 65 and older who have, or whose spouses have, paid Medicare taxes for more than
40 quarters are eligible. The original Medicare Plan consisted of two parts.22 Part A, the hospital
insurance program, covers inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, and some home health care.
Almost all retirees are automatically enrolled in Part A when they turn 65 and there are no
premiums paid for this coverage. For the ﬁrst 60 days of a hospital stay, Medicare pays all covered
costs except a deductible, which equalled $912 in 2005. For days 61 through 90 Medicare requires
a co-pay that was $228 per day in 2005. For days 91-150 this co-pay rose to $456 per day. Hospital
stays beyond 150 days are not covered at all by Medicare. For “skilled nursing facility” care, the
coinsurance amount is about $114 per day for days 21 through 100 each beneﬁt period, but no
coverage is provided beyond the 100th day in the beneﬁt period.23 That is, Medicare covers short
nursing home stays (up to 100 days) for acute episodes, but does not cover long term care.
Medicare Part B (also called Medicare Insurance) covers Medicare eligible physician services,
outpatient hospital services, certain home health services, and durable medical equipment. Part
B enrollees have to pay a monthly premium, which was $67 in 2004. Almost all people choose
21See Culter, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for a simple model in which more risk averse individuals take actions
to reduce risk, thus endogenously generating a negative correlation between risk aversion and risk.
22For details, see Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2005), pages 55-64. The basic Medicare plan is
available everywhere in the country. Some areas also oﬀer what are now called Medicare Advantage Plans, which are
managed care plans (either HMOs or PPOs, i.e., preferred provider organizations). In 2001, approximately 15% of
Medicare beneﬁciaries were enrolled in such Medicare HMOs. See Keane (2004) for more discussion.
23Note that a skilled nursing facility is a nursing home. It provides both long term care and short term care while
a person recovers from an acute episode.
11to enroll in Part B when they turn 65.24 Under Part B, individuals were responsible for a $110
deductible in 2005 and face a 20% co-pay payment for all Medicare-approved services after exceeding
the deductible. Until the recent introduction of “Part D,” which provides limited drug coverage,
Medicare did not cover prescription drugs.
4.2 Medigap
As is clear from above, Medicare leaves seniors at signiﬁcant risk of health care expenditures. To
insure Medicare beneﬁciaries against some of that risk, private insurance companies sell “Medigap”
policies that cover some of the co-pays, deductibles and uncovered expenses, i.e. the “gaps,” in
the basic Medicare plan. Since 1990, by Federal law, Medigap policies are standardized into ten
plans, “A” through “J,” each representing a diﬀerent constellation of beneﬁts. The basic plan, A,
covers all co-pays for hospital stays longer than 60 days, and all co-pays for physician visits and
outpatient care (but not the deductible). All other plans oﬀer these basic beneﬁts, and more. Plan
B, for example, also covers the deductible ($912 in 2005) for hospital stays shorter than 60 days;
Plan C, which is the most popular, also covers co-pays for skilled nursing facilities, the Medicare
Part B deductible and provides foreign travel emergency coverage. Plan J adds to this, among
other things, prescription drug beneﬁts (with a $3000 annual limit in 2004). While not all Medigap
policies are oﬀered in every state, almost every state has a provider which oﬀers the basic plan.25
If an insurer oﬀers any Medigap policy, by law it must oﬀer at least the basic plan.
In addition to being regulated with respect to quality, Medigap pricing and coverage are reg-
ulated in ways that tend to amplify the asymmetries of information favoring the insured. Most
important, Medigap policies are required by law to have an open enrollment period. This six month
open enrolment period begins after the ﬁrst day of the ﬁrst month an individual is both age 65
or older and enrolled in Medicare Part B. During this period, insurers cannot deny Medigap cov-
erage, delay coverage, or price coverage based on pre-existing conditions.26 Instead, during open
enrollment, insurers eﬀectively price only on age, gender and state of residence.27 Moreover, these
24A person is automatically enrolled at age 65 if they have previously applied for Social Security Old Age Beneﬁts.
25The exceptions are Massachusetts, Minnesota and Wisconsin which have received waivers that allow them to
oﬀer somewhat diﬀerent standardized plans.
26Moreover, even after open enrollment, so long as the would-be insured has had Medigap coverage for the past 6
months, enrollment in a diﬀerent plan oﬀered by the same company is guaranteed by law. When a consumer does
switch Medigap plans, the price of the policy may depend on the age at purchase, but coverage cannot be denied.
27Some insurance companies oﬀer menus of Medigap policy options that may help to discriminate among those
with varying health risks. To our knowledge, the pricing comes in only three forms: 1) “age-issued policies” with a
12insurance policies are required by law to be guaranteed renewable. That is, beneﬁciaries may not
be dropped from policies so long as they continue the timely payment of the contracted premiums.
It is also important to note that in some (mostly urban) areas, participants of both Medicare A
and B may enroll in Medicare HMOs, which may or may not charge an extra premium. About 60
percent of the Medicare HMO enrollees do not pay an extra premium. Rather, they exchange re-
strictions on their choices for medical treatment for additional coverage similar to that provided by
typical Medigap policies.28 For this reason, they are discouraged, though not precluded, from pur-
chasing additional Medigap insurance policies.29 Participation in a Medicare HMO is not restricted
by a previous lapse in coverage, unlike Medigap.
5 Data
5.1 Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS)
Our analysis relies on two large data sets, the MCBS and HRS. The MCBS began in Septem-
ber 1991, and is a continuous panel survey of a nationally representative sample of the Medicare
population.30 Beneﬁciaries sampled from Medicare enrollment ﬁles (or appropriate proxies) are
interviewed in person, three times a year, using computer-assisted personal interviewing. All the
MCBS survey data are linked to Medicare claims and other administrative data. The ﬁnal ﬁle
consists of survey, administrative, and claims data, and thus provides a comprehensive view of
respondents’ heath care costs and use.
The central goal of the MCBS is to determine expenditures and sources of payment for all
services used by Medicare beneﬁciaries, including co-payments, deductibles, and uncovered services.
This is important, since our focus is on the total health expenditure, i.e. the combined expenditures
ﬂat premium that depends only on inﬂation and age at the date of purchase, 2) “age-attained policies” that have a
premium that starts lower than age-issued policies and rises on a predictable schedule as the beneﬁciary ages, and 3)
“community rated” policies whose premiums do not depend either on age at purchase or age attained.
28There is substantial evidence of favorable selection into Medicare HMOs (see Keane (2004) for a survey). There
is a strong consensus in the literature that this selection - rather than greater eﬃciency in providing services - is the
primary reason they have lower per patient costs than basic Medicare
29See page 5 of Center for Midicare and Medicaid Services (2004), which states: “If you’re in a Medicare Advantage
Plan, you don’t need a Medigap policy because Medicare Advantage Plans generally cover many of the same beneﬁts
that a Medigap policy would cover, like extra days in the hospital after you used the number of days that Medicare
pays for.”
30See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcbs/ for more details. A supplemental sample is added annually in the
September-December round to replenish sample cells depleted by refusals and death.
13that were covered by Medicare, other public insurance, private insurance, or paid out-of-pocket.
In addition, the MCBS also contains extensive information on the health and demographics of
respondents, and whether respondents have supplemental insurance. The Data Appendix provides
a detailed description of how the variables used in our analysis are constructed.
An important problem we confront in our empirical analysis is that the MCBS does not contain
information on many potential sources of advantageous selection. Conversely, the HRS does not
contain information on health expenditures. Thus, our strategy is to use the MCBS to estimate
the relationship between total health expenditure and a rich set of health variables. We then use
this estimated relationship to form expected health expenditures, ˆ Ei, for each HRS respondent.
We discuss the imputation procedure in Section 7.1.
5.2 Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The HRS began as a panel survey of a nationally representative sample of people aged 51 to
61 in 1992, including their spouses, with oversamples of blacks, hispanics and residents of Florida.
This original cohort of 12,654 respondents has been re-interviewed every other year since. In 1998
the sample was supplemented with both older and younger cohorts. Our interest in those over age
65 leads us to limit our analysis to health and insurance data from the 2000 and 2002 waves of the
original HRS, the latest years for which a ﬁnal version of the data is available.31
The HRS is particularly well-suited to a study of advantageous selection in Medigap insurance.
It contains detailed information about current and past health status of respondents, along with
rich data on their insurance choices and health care costs. The health information includes both
self-reported health and a very large set of objective measures, such as diseases diagnosed, and a
list of activities the respondent has diﬃculty performing.32 The insurance data include information
on where the insurance was acquired, its premiums, and its coverage. A detailed description of the
health and insurance information that we use is provided in the Data Appendix.
The HRS also contains high quality information about economic and demographic variables,
including education, income, wealth and cognition. In addition, the HRS is distinctive in its
attention to variables central to economic theory, including measures of risk aversion, longevity
31Because we use only the 2000 and 2002 waves of the HRS, we only use the 2000 and 2001 waves of the MCBS in
our main analysis, though we use lagged health measures from the 1999 MCBS in several speciﬁcation checks.
32For our purposes, it is important that the health information contained in the HRS and MCBS be very similar.
This is crucial if we are to use the MCBS data to impute expected expenditures of HRS respondents, as we describe
in Section 7.1.
14expectations, and ﬁnancial planning horizons. The following sections describe these theoretically
important measures in greater detail.
5.2.1 Measures of Risk Preference
Risk preferences are central to theories of advantageous selection. Beginning in the ﬁrst wave in
1992, the HRS asked (subsamples of) respondents a series of questions regarding their risk attitudes.
These respondents were ﬁrst asked the following question:
“Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given
the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will double
your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by a
third. Would you take the new job?”
If the answer to the ﬁrst question is “yes,” the interviewer continues with the following question:
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income, and 50-50
that it would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job?”
But, if the answer to the ﬁrst question is “no,” the interviewer instead continues with the question:
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50
that it would cut it by 20 percent. Would you then take the new job?”
The responses to these questions place respondents into four, ordered risk categories: e.g., a person
who says “no“ to both questions is in category I (unwilling to risk any income cuts), while a person
who says “yes“ to both questions is in category IV (willing to risk a 50% cut in income). In Wave 2,
a randomly selected sub-sample answered the same sequence of questions, supplemented to include
jobs with risks of 10% and 75% declines in income.
A number of studies have used these measures of risk preferences and found them to be sig-
niﬁcant predictors of risk-taking behavior both in the HRS and in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. See, for example, Barsky et al. (1997) on smoking, drinking and insurance purchase,
Lusardi (1998) on wealth accumulation, Charles and Hurst (2003) and Kimball et al. (2005) on
portfolio choice, Kan (2003) on residential and job mobility, and Schmidt (2006) on the timing of
fertility and marriage. Assuming that an individual’s responses to these hypothetical income gam-
bles are error-prone reﬂections of his/her ﬁxed, constant relative risk aversion preferences, Kimball
15et al. (2005) estimate the risk tolerance for each respondent in the HRS by maximum likelihood.
In the bulk of our analysis, we use their estimates to form our measures of risk aversion (see their
Table 6).
5.2.2 Expectations and Planning Horizons
Longevity expectations may also play an role in determining health insurance choices, though
the net eﬀect of a higher longevity expectation on investment in health is theoretically ambiguous.
Those who expect to live longer may want to spend more now on their health as such investment will
pay dividends over a longer horizon (see Khwaja 2005). Thus, they would demand more insurance.
On the other hand, the marginal value of additional current health investment may be lower when a
long life already seems likely. The HRS collects detailed information about longevity expectations.
Our focus is on the response to the question, asked of all respondents age 65 and younger, and
repeated in every HRS wave, “What is (percent chance) you will live to 75 or more?” In our
analysis, we use the most recent available response to this question as our measure of longevity
expectations.33
Like expectations for longevity, the length of ﬁnancial planning horizons (which presumably
reﬂects both uncertainty and the subjective rate of time discount) may inﬂuence insurance choices.
Here, the eﬀect seems unambiguous, as those with longer horizons would be more willing to pay
larger immediate costs (premiums) to avoid expected future costs. The HRS also collects informa-
tion on ﬁnancial planning horizons. Speciﬁcally, respondents in Wave 1 were asked:34
“In deciding how much of their (family) income to spend or save, people are likely to
think about diﬀerent ﬁnancial planning periods. In planning your (family’s) saving and
spending, which of the time periods listed in the booklet is most important to you [and
your (husband/wife/ partner)]? 1. Next few months, 2. Next year, 3. Next few years,
4. Next 5-10 years, 5. Longer than 10 years.”
We use indicator variables for each of these four responses in Wave 1 as our measures of the
33This question presumably measures longevity expectations with error, and may reﬂect both beliefs about longevity
and the degree of certainty about those beliefs. Evidence consistent with both error and uncertainty about beliefs is
found in the heaping of responses around focal response such as zero, ﬁfty and, to a lesser extent, one hundred. See
Kezdi and Willis (2005) for a thorough discussion of these measures.
34This question was also asked, at random, of one out of ten respondents in Waves 4 and 5, but was not asked
of anyone age 65 and older in Wave 6. Of the 11,626 respondents who answered this question in Wave 1, just 821
answered it again in Wave 4 and 941 in Wave 5.
16respondent’s ﬁnancial planning horizon.
5.2.3 Measures of Cognition
Our measure of a person’s cognition combines his/her performance on four diﬀerent tests/questions:
word recall, a Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status (TICS) score, subtraction, and numeracy.
These scores may proxy for an individual’s degree of economic “rationality,” i.e. his/her ability to
think through the costs and beneﬁts of Medigap insurance. There is a large body of literature show-
ing that many of the elderly have diﬃculty understanding the basic Medicare entitlement, and/or
the features of supplemental insurance (see, e.g., Harris and Keane 1999 for empirical evidence and
Keane 2004 for a survey of the literature, much of which we cited in the introduction).
5.3 Medigap Insurance Status
Both the MCBS and HRS contain detailed information about respondents’ health insurance
choices. Speciﬁcally, each reports if the respondent is covered by Medicare, Parts A and B, and
whether that coverage is provided by a Medicare Advantage Plan (HMO/PPO). We also know if the
respondent had supplemental coverage and, if so, its premium and its source. Given that our goal is
study the decision to buy supplemental insurance, our sample should include only people with the
following characteristics: (1) they should be covered by basic Medicare (parts A and B), (2) they
should not have access to free (or heavily subsidized) supplemental coverage provided by a former
employer, or Medicaid, or some other government agency (e.g., the Veterans Administration). That
is, we want to limit the sample to people who would have to pay more than a nominal premium to
obtain supplemental coverage.
Our main empirical analysis is based on two alternative rules for sample inclusion and two
alternative indicators for Medigap status. Both samples include only respondents covered by basic
Medicare. In the ﬁrst sample, we delete anyone covered by employer-provided supplemental health
insurance, Medicaid or other government insurance (e.g., VA insurance). Then, we deﬁne Medigap
status as equal to one if the respondent has purchased additional private insurance that is secondary
to Medicare.
The second sample retains respondents who have employer provided supplemental insurance,
provided they must pay at least $500 per year in premiums for that insurance. Then, we again
deﬁne Medigap status as equal to one if the respondent has purchased private insurance that is
secondary to Medicare, but this time including the employer provided insurance for which they pay
at least $500 in premiums.
17Below, we separately report results using both deﬁnitions of Medigap status. To preview, none
of the results, either qualitatively or quantitatively, depends on which deﬁnition of Medigap status
we use. For our main analysis, we choose to code Medicare HMO enrollees as simply having basic
Medicare because, as we mentioned earlier, 60 percent of Medicare HMO enrollees do not pay any
extra premium. Thus their decision to enroll in a Medicare HMO is often really a trade-oﬀ between
restrictions on provider choice vs. additional coverage for the gaps in Medicare, not a decision to
pay for additional coverage. However in Section 8 we also report results where we code Medicare
HMO plan members in diﬀerent ways. The qualitative results do not depend on whether we treat
Medicare HMO members as having “Medigap,” or instead drop them from the analysis.
5.4 Measures of Health and Medical Expenditure Risk
Both the MCBS and HRS have detailed measures of observable health.35 For our empirical
analysis, however, we need to summarize those health variables into a uni-dimensional measure of
health expenditure risk. That is, while we consider extension of classic models of adverse selection to
include multi-dimensional private information, we continue within the classical tradition of viewing
both health risk and the level of insurance coverage as one-dimensional constructs.36
For our measure of ex post health expenditure risk, we use “Total Medical Expenditure,” which
corresponds to the variable pamttot in the MCBS. This variable is constructed by CMS from a
variety of sources, including Medicare administrative records and survey responses.37 In calculating
pamttot, CMS includes, for any health care event identiﬁed either from the survey respondent or
from the respondent’s Medicare ﬁle, payments from 11 potential sources: Medicare fee-for-service,
Medicare HMOs, Medicaid, employer-based private health insurance, individually purchased private
35See the category “Health” in the data appendix for details.
36By doing this we abstract from the following sort of possibility: suppose a person is relatively healthy overall, but
chooses a Medigap plan because it has good coverage of expenses of treating a particular chronic condition from which
he/she suﬀers. If such cases were common, it might appear that Medigap participants had lower than average total
medical costs - advantageous selection - when in fact they are buying Medigap to cover costs of particular conditions.
This scenario seems implausible for two reasons: First, why would people with certain chronic conditions tend to be
healthier than the average person in the population in other ways? Second, it is ruled out by the legal restrictions on
what Medigap plans must cover. That is, as we discussed earlier, by law Medigap plans must cover various co-pays
and deductibles not covered by basic Medicare, so they can reasonably be thought of as simply providing “more”
coverage in a uni-dimensional level of coverage framework. Medigap plans cannot be structured to cover or include
particular health conditions.
37See MCBS public use documentation on “Cost and Use” Sections 3 and 5 for more details. This documentation
is available online at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/mcbs/.
18health insurance, private insurance managed care, private insurance with unknown sources, the VA
and other public insurance, out-of-pocket payments and uncollected liability. Thus, the variable
pamttot comes as close as is possible to measuring total health expenditure from all sources.
An important question is whether total medical expenditure is indeed the most relevant measure
of health expenditure risk when a would-be-insured contemplates whether to purchase Medigap.
One argument in favor of treating total medical expenditure as the relevant risk is that Medigap
policies by law cover broad ranges of expenditure not covered by Medicare (i.e., medicare deductibles
and co-pays, prescription drugs). A person in worse health would typically tend to have greater
expenditure risk in all of these areas. Thus, to a good approximation, Medigap plans can reasonably
be thought of a simply providing “more” coverage in a uni-dimensional health risk framework.
On the other hand, a more accurate measure of the incentive to purchase Medigap would
be expected Medigap covered expenditure. Ideally if we could identify all itemized charges an
individual experienced in a year, we could determine the amount of reimbursement that he/she
would receive under basic Medicare vs. under various Medigap plans. Two limitations of our data
preclude this approach. First, we do not have itemized medical bills; second, almost all health
questions in both data sets cover health stocks, i.e., whether an individual has ever had certain
treatments or diagnoses. Nonetheless, we also report results from an alternative measure of health,
which is we call “Potential Medigap Expenditure.” This is “Total Medical Expenditure” minus that
part which is reimbursed by Medicare and other government insurance (see Section 8.1.1). This
should reasonably approximate the medical expenditure that could have been covered by Medigap.
6 Evidence of Advantageous Selection
In this section we present a set of simple regressions that together provide strong evidence
of advantageous selection in the Medigap market. Those who purchase Medigap appear to be
healthier, and to have lower ex post medical expenditure. We also present direct evidence that
healthier people are more likely to purchase Medigap insurance, conditional on observables that
determine price.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the “Medigap” and “No Medigap” samples used
in our analysis, for the MCBS and HRS separately. Recall that under our ﬁrst Medigap deﬁnition
we exclude from the sample those with employer provided supplemental insurance, while under
19the second deﬁnition we retain those with employer provided Medigap coverage, provided they pay
a premium of at least $500. Thus, as we move from the ﬁrst to the second Medigap deﬁnition,
we increase the number of observations with “Medigap,” but do not change the sample with “No
Medigap.” Hence, the descriptive statistics for the “No Medigap” sample do not change.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the “Medigap” and “No Medigap” samples in
gender and age, but they do diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their educational attainment and marital status.
The mean “Total Medical Expenditure” for the “No Medigap” sample is more than $12,000, while
it is only about $8,400 for the “Medigap” sample. On the other hand, the medical expenditure
reimbursed by the Medicare is slightly higher for those with “Medigap” than for those without,
consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature (see, e.g., Khandker and McCormack 1999).38
[Tables 1-2 About Here]
Under either “Medigap” deﬁnition some observations are dropped from our analysis: those
covered by Medicaid or VA beneﬁts are dropped under both deﬁnitions, and some respondents
with employer sponsored insurance are dropped in each case. Table 2 provides some summary
statistics on the observations that we drop. For instance, as expected, the Medicaid population
is younger, but sicker. Their average medical expenditure is much higher than for people in our
sample.
6.2 Basic Regression Results: Indirect Evidence of Advantageous Selection
Table 3 reports results from regressing “Total Medical Expenditure” on Medigap status, along
with controls for the determinants of price: gender, a third-order polynomial of age, and controls
for State and year.39 Panels A and B of Table 3 diﬀer only in their deﬁnitions of “Medigap” as
explained in Section 5.3. For now we focus on the results reported in columns (1)-(3), which give
results for the full sample, and for male and female sub-samples.40 The column labelled “All” in
each panel shows that those with Medigap have expenditures that are, on average, about $4,000
38The view in the literature is that Medigap, by covering Medicare co-pays and deductibles, increases demand for
Medicare covered services.
39Recall that, due to the government regulation of Medigap pricing, premiums depend almost exclusively on State
of residence, age and gender (see Robst 2001). Of course, to the extent that gender and age predict health, the
regressions also partly control for health. Total medical expenditure is higher for older individuals, as expected.
40We discuss the role of results in columns (4)-(6), that include additional demographic controls, later in Section
6.4.
20less than those without Medigap. The negative relationship between Medigap coverage and total
medical expenditure is stronger for women (about $6,000) than for men (about $2,000).41
[Table 3 and 4 About Here]
Table 4 reports results from regressions analogous to those in Table 3, but with the addition of
extensive controls for health, which we describe in detail in the Data Appendix. Again we focus on
results in columns (1)-(3). Conditional on observable health, those with Medigap have total health
care spending of $1,900 more, on average, than those without Medigap. The positive association
between Medigap and total medical expenditure seems to be stronger for males (about $2,300) than
for females (about $1,500).
Together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 show there is advantageous selection in the Medigap
market - i.e., those with better health are more likely to purchase Medigap, and therefore Medigap
enrollees have lower ex post health care expenditures than those who have only basic Medicare.
Once we condition on health status, those with Medigap have higher total health expenditures, as
we would expect given they face a lower price of health care.42
[Table 5 About Here]
Table 5 reports results from regressions analogous to those in Table 4, except that our extensive
list of health variables is summarized by ﬁve health factors using factor analysis. By examining
the factor loadings (not reported), we can give interpretations to these factors.43 Factor 1 can
41It is interesting that advantageous selection appears to be quantitatively larger among females. Reporting results
separately for males and females is important in the light of the critiques raised by Dionne, Gouri´ eroux and Vanasse
(2001) in their analysis of Puelz and Snow (1994). They argued that Puelz and Snow’s ﬁnding of adverse selection
in the automobile insurance market resulted from use of overly simple functional forms in their estimating equation,
and once additional interaction terms were included, the ﬁnding of adverse selection disappears (this point was also
raised in Chiappori and Salani´ e 2000). Reporting results separately for male and female samples is equivalent to
interacting all the terms in the regression with gender. Sample size limitations prevent us from including a full set of
interactions with State and age dummies as well. Later, in Section 8.1.4, we do interact the Medigap coeﬃcient with
a low order polynomial in age.
42A possible concern is that the health measures we use Table 4 could be aﬀected by Medigap insurance status
itself. For example, if those with Medigap are more likely to seek care, they may be more likely to have certain
conditions diagnosed. This would make the Medigap population seem less healthy than they actually are (relative to
the basic Medicare population). This would bias the Medigap coeﬃcient in Table 4 in a negative direction (that is,
we would understate the degree of advantageous selection, and understate the positive price eﬀect).
43The factor loadings are available from the authors upon request.
21be interpreted as a “non-response” factor, which loads heavily on variables that are indicators
of non-response (i.e., there is a non-responder type). Factor 2 loads negatively on self-reported
health and positively on diﬃculties in instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), and thus is
an unhealthy factor. Factor 3 loads positively on self-reported health and negatively on measured
medical conditions in the past two years, and thus is a healthy factor. Factor 4 loads positively
on self reported health and self-reported health changes in the last year. It represents a part of
self-reported health not captured by Factor 2 and 3. Factor 5 appears to be more or less noise.
The coeﬃcient estimates for Medigap in Table 5 are qualitatively unchanged from those in
Table 4. As expected, factor 2 is positively related to health care expenditure, factors 3 and 4 are
negatively related, and factors 1 and 5 are not related.
6.3 More Direct Evidence of Advantageous Selection
The pattern of coeﬃcients on Medigap in Tables 3-5 imply that those who purchase Medigap are
healthier than those who do not. Table 6 reports more direct evidence on the same point. There,
we report partial correlations between Medigap coverage and the health factors, conditional on
gender and age. As before, Panels A and B present results under the two alternative deﬁnitions of
Medigap. The columns labelled “EXP” simply report the regression coeﬃcients for the factors from
speciﬁcation (1) in Table 5. These coeﬃcient estimates inform us whether the factor is “healthy”
or “unhealthy.” The columns labelled “PCORR” report the partial correlations.
For most part, Table 6 reveals a consistent pattern: important unhealthy (healthy) factors
tend to have negative (positive) and signiﬁcant partial correlations with Medigap coverage. For
example, in Panel A, Column “All” shows that factors 2 and 3 are the most important unhealthy
and healthy factors, respectively. Factor 2, the most important unhealthy factor, has a sizeable
negative correlation with Medigap (−.1166 under the ﬁrst Medigap deﬁnition and −.1107 under
the second) and p-values of almost 0. In contrast, factor 3, the most important healthy factor, has
a positive correlation with Medigap (.0319 and .0297 respectively for the ﬁrst and second Medigap
deﬁnitions) and, again, p-values of almost 0. The factors that have Medigap correlations of the
“wrong“ sign are typically of two kinds: either the factor itself is not very important (with small
and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates), or the partial correlation is statistically insigniﬁcant. The
partial correlations between factors 2 and 3 and Medigap status in the male and female sub-samples
are of the same signs as and similar magnitude to those for the whole sample.44
44The health factors for the three samples “All”, “Female” and “Male” are separately estimated and, as a result,
the factors for the three samples are actually diﬀerent factors.
22[Table 6 About Here]
6.4 Discussion
So far we have established that, in the MCBS data, total expenditures for those with Medigap
are, on average, about $4,000 less than for those without Medigap, controlling only for determinants
of price. But, if we also control for observable health variables, expenditures for those with Medigap
average about $2,000 more than for those without. We conclude that those with less health risk are
more likely to purchase Medigap, and thus that there is “advantageous selection” in this market.
Advantageous selection seems to be somewhat larger for the female population than for the male
population, but in both sub-populations it is very signiﬁcant, both in magnitude and statistically.
One may naturally ask whether we can ﬁnd (unpriced) variables within the MCBS that both (i)
aﬀect Medigap purchase and (ii) are correlated with health. Such variables may serve as the source
of advantageous selection we documented above. The demographic variables in the MCBS are the
natural candidates to examine. Thus, we re-estimate the regression speciﬁcations as reported in
columns (1)-(3) of Tables 3-5 with a rather complete set of demographic variables such as income,
education and marital status etc., and report the results in columns (4)-(6). It is important to
emphasize that, in order to establish the existence of advantageous selection, we should not include
these additional demographic variables, because insurance companies are not allowed to price on
them. The only reason to examine results using these additional demographic controls is to gauge
the extent to which observed advantageous selection can be explained by these demographics. That
is, to look for the sources of advantageous selection.
In Table 3, controlling for the additional demographics lowers the magnitude of the Medigap
coeﬃcient only slightly. For example, for the whole sample, expenditures for those with Medigap
are about $3,800 less than for those without Medigap, compared to $4,400 without the demographic
controls. But none of the qualitative results are aﬀected by the inclusion of these controls. Similarly,
in Table 4 for the whole sample, the Medigap coeﬃcient estimate falls only slightly to $1,700 with
the additional demographic controls, compared to $1967 without.45 In Table 5 when we use health
factors, again the point estimate of Medigap changes only modestly when we add the demographic
controls.
Thus we conclude that the bulk of advantageous selection is left unexplained by demographics
45In regressions reported in speciﬁcations (4)-(6), we ﬁnd that total medical expenditure is higher for individu-
als with annual income above $45,000; but education does not seem to have a systematic eﬀect on total medical
expenditure.
23such as race/ethnicity, income, education and marital status. As a result, we will have to extend
our search for the sources of advantageous selection, which we describe in detail in the section
below.
7 Sources of Advantageous Selection
In Section 6, we used MCBS data to provide both direct and indirect evidence of quantitatively
important advantageous selection - healthier seniors with lower ex post expenditure risk are more
likely to purchase Medigap. In this section we investigate the sources of advantageous selection.
That is, we seek to identify dimensions of individuals’ private information that satisfy the two
properties we mentioned in Section 3: i.e., unpriced variables that both (i) make individuals more
likely to purchase Medigap, and (ii) are negatively correlated with their health expenditure risk.
7.1 Empirical Strategy
The ideal data set for our analysis would be the HRS augmented by links to Medicare admin-
istrative data containing information on total medical expenditure. Unfortunately HRS is not yet
properly linked to the Medicare administrative records, and has poor information on out-of-pocket
spending relative to MCBS. On the other hand, MCBS does not contain information about many
suspected sources of advantageous selection. We now describe our empirical strategy that combines
MCBS and HRS to examine the sources of advantageous selection.46
The data in MCBS can be written as
{Ei,Mi,Hi,Di}i∈IMCBS , (5)
and the data in HRS as
{Mj,Hj,Dj,Xj}j∈IHRS (6)
where IMCBS and IHRS denote the MCBS and HRS sample respectively. Note that the variables
{M,H,D}, which denote Medigap coverage, health measures and demographics, are common to
both data sets. But E, total medical expenditure, appears only in the MCBS, while X, the list of
variables that we think are potential sources of advantageous selection, appears only in the HRS.
46There is a sizeable literature on empirical methods to deal with the incomplete data by combining multiple data
sets. See, for example, Angrist and Krueger (1992), Arellano and Meghir (1992), Ichimura and Martinez-Sanchis
(2004) and references therein. But none of the methods developed in these papers applies to our problem.
24Our empirical strategy uses the MCBS data to estimate prediction equations for total medical
expenditure risk, as well as its variance. These equations will utilize covariates that are also
available in the HRS, so that we can use the prediction equations to impute the mean and variance
of ex post health expenditures for each person in our HRS sample. Implementation of this strategy
requires a determination about which sample in MCBS to use in estimating the prediction equations.
Conceptually, we want a measure of expenditure risk for a person in the position of having only
basic Medicare who is considering whether to buy Medigap. To do this, should we use only those
without Medigap, or should we use the whole sample? We follow a practical strategy and estimate
the prediction equations in both ways. Then we show that our results are robust to which sample
we use.
Prediction Equations Using MCBS Subsample with No Medigap Coverage. In the ﬁrst
method, we only use the subsample in MCBS with no Medigap coverage to estimate the mean and
variance of medical expenditures. Suppose the mean and variance prediction equations obtained
from the MCBS are:
ˆ Ei1 = ˆ α0 + ˆ α1Hi + ˆ α2Di, (7)
\ V ARi1 =

Ei − ˆ Ei1
2
= ˆ β0 + ˆ β1Hi + ˆ β2Di. (8)
We can then impute the mean and variance of medical expenditures for the HRS sample as follows:
for each j ∈ IHRS, the imputed mean medical expenditure is
ˆ Ej1 = ˆ α0 + ˆ α1Hj + ˆ α2Dj, (9)
and the imputed variance of medical expenditure is
[ V ARj1 = ˆ β0 + ˆ β1Hj + ˆ β2Dj. (10)
Prediction Equations Using the Whole MCBS In the second method, we use the whole
MCBS sample to estimate the mean and variance of medical expenditure. In this case, we include
in the regressions a Medigap status indicator Mi. That is,
ˆ Ei2 = ˆ γ0 + ˆ γ1Mi + ˆ γ2Hi + ˆ γ3Di, (11)
\ V ARi2 =

Ei − ˆ Ei2
2
= ˆ ξ0 + ˆ ξ1Mi + ˆ ξ2Hi + ˆ ξ3Di. (12)
We then impute the mean and variance for each member j ∈ IHRS of the HRS sample, as follows:
ˆ Ej2 = ˆ γ0 + ˆ γ2Hj + ˆ γ3Dj, (13)
\ V ARj2 = ˆ ξ0 + ˆ ξ2Hj + ˆ ξ3Dj. (14)
25Note that in the imputation equations (13) and (14), we set Mj equal to zero for the HRS sample.
Thus the predictions above are for the mean and variance of medical expenditures for a person
without Medigap coverage.
Pros and Cons of the Two Imputations. Conceptually, neither of the above imputation
methods is perfect. If selection into Medigap were random, then either approach would be correct.
However, given selection, each method has a limitation. First, ˆ Ej1 may not be an unbiased estimate
of pre-Medigap-purchase mean health expenditure risk. For example, if those with Medigap have
systematically better unobserved health (just as they have better observed health), then ˆ Ej1 will
tend to over-estimate expected medical expenditure for those in HRS who actually have Medigap.
This will lead us to understate the degree of advantageous selection in the HRS.
In the second imputation method it is necessary to include the Medigap status indicator Mi
in prediction equations (11) and (12). Otherwise we will exaggerate the pre-Medigap-purchase
expenditure risk by including in it the positive “moral hazard“ or price eﬀect of Medigap coverage.
However, given selection into Medigap, the Medigap coeﬃcient will be biased. For example, if those
with Medigap have systematically better unobserved health (just as they have better observed
health), the Medigap coeﬃcient will be downward biased (i.e., we understate the price eﬀect). This
would cause ˆ Ej2 to also overstate the pre-Medigap expenditure risk for those who actually have
Medigap.
Despite these conceptual problems, it is worth emphasizing that the list of observable health
variables that we include in our imputation is extremely detailed and captures a broad range of
conditions. Thus, it is plausible that selection based on unobserved health may not be quantitatively
important. The fact that the qualitative results below are robust to either of the above imputation
methods also lends credibility to our ﬁndings.
Identifying the Sources of Advantageous Selection. Next we describe our approach to iden-
tifying the sources of advantageous selection. With the imputed ˆ Ejk and \ V ARjk, our augmented
HRS data can now be represented as:
n




For simplicity, we henceforth suppress the subscript k that denotes the method of imputation but
report results separately for k ∈ {1,2}.We ﬁrst regress
Mj = δ0 + δ1 ˆ Ej + δ2Dj + εj, (16)
26where, as before, the variables in Dj include a third order polynomial in age, gender and State of
residence, to capture the pricing of Medigap insurance. As we report below, and consistent with
our ﬁnding in Section 6, we obtain a negative and signiﬁcant estimate for δ1, implying advantageous
selection in the purchase of Medigap in the HRS.
Next, in order to determine the sources of advantageous selection, we gradually add controls from
the list of variables contained in {Xj, \ V ARj}. We ﬁrst sequentially add risk tolerance risktolj,
and the interaction between risk tolerance risktolj and expenditure risk measure \ V ARj. Then
we add other potential sources of advantageous selection, including education, income, cognition,
longevity expectation and ﬁnancial planning horizon, in that order.
As we show below, when we estimate the partial correlation between Medigap coverage and
health expenditure risk, controlling not only for the determinants of price, Dj, but also for {Xj,
\ V ARj}, the partial correlation will turn positive. More precisely, when we estimate
Mj = θ0 + θ1 ˆ Ej + θ2risktolj + θ3 [ V ARj × risktolj + θ4Xj + θ5Dj + εj, (17)
we ﬁnd that ˆ θ1 is positive and signiﬁcant - consistent with the “positive correlation property”
predicted by standard insurance models with uni-dimensional private information. This is the
sense in which we say we have successfully identiﬁed several key sources of advantageous selection.
Comments About Our Empirical Strategy. Three comments about our approach are worth
stressing. First, the imputation of expected medical expenditure levels for each member of the HRS
(based on a prediction equation estimated using the MCBS) is meant to summarize a person’s overall
health risk type in a single variable. We need to enter a single uni-dimensional “risk” measure into
regression equation (16) in order to test the positive correlation property. An alternative strategy
would be to use the extensive set of health measures available in the HRS, Hj, to construct a
single measure of a person’s health. But this approach is not feasible for two reasons: (1) When
we factor analyze the health variables we obtain three independent and important health factors
(see Section 6.2). Thus, the health measures do not provide us with a uni-dimensional measure of
health risk. (2) From a theoretical point of view, for purposes of judging selection into diﬀerent
types of insurance coverage, the relevant variable is expenditure risk, not health status per se (e.g.,
a person could be less healthy but also less expensive to treat, or even untreatable).
Second, an alternative (and in some sense symmetric) empirical strategy would be to impute
the missing variables in the list X for the MCBS sample, using prediction equations for X from the
HRS sample. However, it is not clear what variables in the HRS could be used to predict X except
27for the demographic variables. Moreover, this approach would require imputation of several more
variables than our approach.
Finally, the limitations of all the imputation methods we have described would suggest esti-
mation of a joint model of Medigap purchase and health expenditures, with explicit modelling of
selection, using data from the MCBS and HRS simultaneously. This is an important direction for
future research, but it would involve much stronger assumptions about the joint distribution of
{Mj,E,Hj,Dj,Xj}.
7.2 Comparison of MCBS and HRS Data
Before we describe our main results, we ﬁrst show that the MCBS and HRS samples are in
fact quite similar, suggesting that using the MCBS to impute means and variances of medical
expenditure for the HRS is reasonable. Panel A of Table 7 compares MCBS and HRS means
for the common set of demographic variables, using the sample based on the ﬁrst deﬁnition of
Medigap. The fraction female and conditional age distributions are roughly similar. The percentage
of individuals with Medigap is also similar in the two samples: 45.9 percent in the MCBS and 48.6
percent in the HRS.47 In both the MCBS and HRS, close to 95 percent of the sample are covered
by both Medicare A and B. Marital status, number of children and educational attainment diﬀer
only slightly in the two surveys.
[Table 7 About Here]
Panel B of Table 7 reports similar comparisons between the MCBS and HRS for the sample based
on the second deﬁnition of Medigap. As expected, adding those with employer sponsored health
insurance slightly lowers the female proportion, because more of those still working (or retired
from employers who provide retiree health beneﬁts) are men, and slightly lowers the average age,
because those still working tend to be slightly younger. The percentage with Medigap increases to
54.5 percent in MCBS and 56.8 percent in HRS. Overall, the MCBS and HRS samples appear to
be quite similar in the means of the common set of demographic variables.
7.3 Sources of Advantageous Selection: Main Findings
This section reports our main results regarding the sources of advantageous selection. Table
8 reports results based on our ﬁrst method of imputing health expenditure risk (see Section 7.1).
47Medicare HMO enrollees are treated as having only basic Medicare in these summary statistics.
28Panel A and B respectively report the results for the two deﬁnitions of “Medigap” insurance status
(see Section 5.3 for details). In the ﬁrst three columns of each panel we report estimates of the
coeﬃcient on predicted health expenditure ˆ Ej in equations (16)-(17). We actually enter ˆ Ej into the
regressions in tens of thousands of dollars ($10,000) to make the results more easily interpretable.
The next several columns labelled “Conditioning Variables” indicate the list of control variables
included in X, with “Y” (“N”) indicating that a particular variable is (is not) included. The last
column gives the sample size for the regression.
Notice that, as we add more variables to the regressions, the number of observations drops,
due to missing values.48 Two variables lead to substantial loss of observations: First, adding risk
tolerance to the regression eliminates about 2/3 of the sample, because the HRS only asked these
questions in about a one-third sub-sample. Second, when we include the cognition variables (in
particular cognition questions related to numeracy) we lose another half of the sample. In order
to avoid the possibility that our results are driven by the changing samples, we re-run all our
regressions on three samples. Column A reports results using the full sample, column B reports
results for medium sample (for which the risk tolerance measure is available), and column C for
the smallest sample (for which the cognition variables are available).
Rows (1) and (9) show that, regardless of the deﬁnition of “Medigap” insurance status, if we
do not control for any of the Xj variables, individuals with higher health expenditure risk are less
likely to purchase Medigap. For the sample with the most complete data, the point estimates imply
that a $10,000 increase in health expenditure risk reduces the probability of buying Medigap by
5.7 to 7.6 percentage points. This, of course, is simply a conﬁrmation (from a diﬀerent angle and
using diﬀerent data) of our ﬁnding of advantageous selection reported in Section 6.
Rows (2) and (10) add risk tolerance alone to the regression (16). This speciﬁcation is important
because the previous literature we have cited, both theoretical and empirical, has focused almost
exclusively on risk aversion as the source of advantageous selection. Note that the inclusion of
risk tolerance only slightly reduces, if at all, the magnitude of the negative coeﬃcient on predicted
health expenditures. This result does not depend on the linear speciﬁcation for the eﬀect of risk
tolerance. If, instead, risk tolerance enters as third-order polynomial or as a complete set of dummy
variables, the point estimate of coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej is essentially unchanged. Risk tolerance is, however,
a signiﬁcant predictor of Medigap purchase. When entered as a set of dummy variables, an F-test
rejects the null hypothesis of joint insigniﬁcance with a p-value of less than 0.001.
Results do change, however, when we also control for the variance of health expenditures. In
48Most of the missing values result from the relevant survey questions not being asked, instead of non-response.
29rows (3) and (11) we report results from a regression that includes risk tolerance, the predicted
variance, and the interaction between the two. The inclusion of these measures aﬀects the coeﬃcient
estimate on ˆ Ej.49 In the medium samples, the estimated coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej remains negative, but is
now statistically indistinguishable from zero. In the small samples, the coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej reverses
its sign from negative to positive, though it is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Notably, the estimated coeﬃcient on the level of risk tolerance and the interaction between
variance [ V ARj and risk tolerance are both negative. The latter is as we would expect. Thus,
the probably of buying insurance increases with greater risk aversion, and more so for a person
who faces a higher variance of expenditures. According our point estimates, at the mean level of
[ V ARj in our sample, a one standard deviation increase in the risk tolerance measure decreases the
probability of purchasing Medigap by 6.7 percentage points. It is also interesting to note that the
coeﬃcient on the variance term [ V ARj is negative. As the interaction between variance and risk
tolerance is also negative, this implies that individuals with higher uncertainty in their medical
expenditures are less likely to purchase Medigap (with this negative eﬀect being larger for people
who are more risk tolerant).
As we include more variables from Xj, reported in rows (4)-(8) for the ﬁrst Medigap deﬁnition
and in rows (12)-(16) for the second Medigap deﬁnition, the coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej eventually becomes
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 to 10 percent level. The most complete speciﬁcation
implies that a $10,000 increase in predicted health expenditure increases the probability of buying
Medigap by 7.8 percentage points. All of the new Xj variables we include shift the partial correlation
between health expenditure risk and Medigap coverage in a positive direction.
Among all the variables in Xj, cognition and income are distinctive. If only cognition and/or
income are included in Xj, it substantially changes the estimated coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej; and when all
variables in Xj are included in the regression, both cognition and income stand out as signiﬁcant
predictors of Medigap purchase.50
For example, adding the cognition variables alone changes the coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej from -.057,
p-value 0.12, to -.012, p-value 0.68; and in the full regression that includes all elements of Xj, a
standard deviation increase in just the TICS score is associated with a 5.4 percentage point increase
in the probability of purchasing a Medigap policy. Similarly, adding income variables alone changes
49The bulk of the change in the coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej is attributable to the inclusion of a control for the variance in
health expenditure. For example, in results not shown here, adding just a control for variance in the smallest sample
increases the coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej to .0370, p-value .143, when we use the ﬁrst deﬁnition of Medigap.
50For reasons of space, these results are not presented here but are available from the authors upon request.
30the coeﬃcient on ˆ Ej from -.057, p-value 0.12, to -.022, p-value 0.45; and someone with an annual
income between 45 and 50 thousand dollars is 12 percentage points more likely to purchase a
Medigap Policy than is someone with an income between 15 to 20 thousand dollars. Thus, both
cognition and income provide some important part of the explanation for the otherwise negative
correlation between mean expenditure risk and insurance purchase.
It is worth noting that while most of the elements of Xj would be standard elements of any
complete economic model of insurance choice, cognition is unusual. As discussed in Section 5.2.3,
the cognition variable may proxy for an individual’s degree of economic “rationality,” i.e. his/her
ability to think through the costs and beneﬁts of Medigap insurance.51 It’s signiﬁcance is consistent
with a large literature suggesting many senior citizens have diﬃculty understanding the rules of the
Medicare program and the features of Medigap policies (see the introduction for further discussion
and citations).
[Tables 8-9 About Here]
Table 9 reports analogous results using the second imputation method we described earlier,
where we use all observations in the MCBS to estimate the prediction equations (11) and (12). The
results in Table 9 are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 8. Note, however, that the results
in Panel B of Table 9, where we use the second deﬁnition of Medigap status, are somewhat weaker
in terms of statistical signiﬁcance.
In summary, these results indicate that sources of the advantageous selection we documented
in Section 6 include a number of factors – income, education, longevity expectations and ﬁnancial
planing horizon – that would typically enter a rich economic model of insurance purchase. In
addition, however, we ﬁnd evidence that factors typically omitted from economic models, such as
levels of cognition and ﬁnancial numeracy, are also important sources of advantageous selection.
Those who are likely better able to calculate the costs and beneﬁts of Medigap purchase are both
healthier and more likely to purchase Medigap. We ﬁnd no evidence, however, that risk preferences,
which the theoretical literature has focused on, and which are signiﬁcant predictors of Medigap
purchase, can explain advantageous selection in this market. These ﬁndings are robust to changes
in the sample and in the methods we use to impute expected medical expenditure and its variance.
Thus, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst study to provide direct evidence on the
sources of advantageous selection in health insurance markets; it is also the ﬁrst study to identify
51One might be concerned that cognition actually proxies for a dimension of health. But it should be noted that
the health control variables include extensive measures of mental and neurological illnesses including Alzheimer’s
disease.
31a set of variables that are suﬃcient to explain away the negative correlation between ex post
health expenditure and Medigap coverage documented in Section 6, and obtain a positive partial
correlation between health expenditure risk and the level insurance coverage.
8 Robustness of Results
In this section we describe several additional checks on the robustness of our results, using
alternative measures of health risk, alternative treatments of Medicare HMO/Medicare Advantage
Plan participants, trimming of outliers, and alternative measures of the degree of uncertainty in
health expenditures (other than the predicted variance [ V ARj we used in Section 7).
8.1 Robustness of the Evidence of Advantageous Selection
8.1.1 Alternative Uni-dimensional Measures of Health
So far we have used “Total Medical Expenditure” as a uni-dimensional measure of health (see
Section 5.4 for justiﬁcation and discussion). Here we show that our ﬁndings about advantageous
selection remain substantively unchanged if we replace this measure with the level of medical
expenditure that is not reimbursed by Medicare. We call this alternative measure “Potential
Medigap Expenditure” because it is arguably a good approximation of the expenditure risk faced
by a person who has only basic Medicare coverage. Panel A of Table 10 examines the sensitivity
of our results to using this alternative measure.
[Table 10 About Here]
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 reproduce the Medigap coeﬃcients from Tables 3-4 (based on
total expenditure), while columns (3)-(4) present the results using potential Medigap expenditure.
We report results from two regression speciﬁcations in the rows labelled (1) and (2). Regression (1)
is the baseline speciﬁcation that includes only gender, an age polynomial and State of residence as
controls for price. Regression (2) adds the controls for health. As can be seen from Table 10, if we
use potential Medigap expenditure as an alternative measure of health expenditure risk, the basic
message of advantageous selection persists: controlling only for variables used to price Medigap,
the Medigap coeﬃcients are in the range of -$4,000. But, when we control for health, they turn
positive. The positive values are not as large when we use potential Medigap expenditure as the
measure of health. But the key point is that inclusion of the observable health variables signiﬁcantly
32increases the magnitude of the Medigap coeﬃcient in either case, thus indicating, once again, that
those with Medigap are healthier.
8.1.2 Alternative Treatments of Medicare HMOs
So far we have treated anyone with only Medicare coverage (whether it is basic Medicare fee-for-
service or a Medicare HMO) as not having Medigap. However, in 2000 and 2001, approximately 15
percent of all Medicare beneﬁciaries chose to participate in a “Medicare Advantage Plan.” These
are HMOs that have contracted with Medicare to provide Medicare insurance. These plans are
not available everywhere, especially not in rural areas. They require participation in Medicare A
and B, and often charge additional premiums. The beneﬁt to participants of the extra premiums
and the restrictions imposed by the HMO is that the HMO “generally” ﬁlls the same gaps that
Medigap policies do. Thus, the U.S. government’s “Guide to Choosing a Medigap Policy” tells
those who have selected a Medicare Advantage Plan that they do not need a Medigap policy. We
experimented with coding those who have chosen a Medicare HMO either as having a Medigap
status Mi of 1 or coding these respondents as missing.
Panel B of Table 10 reports the Medigap coeﬃcient estimates for two alternative treatments of
those who belong to Medicare HMOs. Columns (1) and (2) report results when they are coded as
having Medigap; while in Columns (3) and (4) they are coded as missing. We note that the recoding
of Medicare HMO participants actually strengthens our ﬁndings of advantageous selection in Section
6. For example, the negative coeﬃcients of Mi in Table 3 became even more negative. This is not
surprising given the strong consensus in the literature (noted earlier) that there is advantageous
selection into Medicare HMOs. Also, counting Medicare HMO participants as having Medigap
does not change the qualitative ﬁndings about the sources of advantageous selection in Section 7.3.
Alternatively, dropping those observations from our analysis also does not change the results, either
qualitatively or quantitatively.
8.1.3 Trimming the Outliers
“Total Medical Expenditure” is known to be right skewed in the population. For example, in
our selected sample, “Total Medical Expenditure” has a skewness of 4.2, with a mean of $10,679
and a median of $3,467; the “Potential Medigap Expenditure” we used in Section 8.1.1 is less
right skewed with a skewness of 3.5, a mean of $6,040 and a median of $2,292. One may argue
that outlier medical expenditures are the medical expenditure risks of particular concern when
individuals consider whether to purchase Medigap. Nevertheless, in Panel C of Table 10 we address
33the concern that our results are driven by these outliers. Columns (1) and (2) report the Medigap
coeﬃcient estimates after we drop the observations whose “Total Medical Expenditure” is above the
95th percentile. The coeﬃcient estimates, not surprisingly, go down, but the qualitative conclusion
regarding the presence of advantageous selection is not aﬀected. Columns (3) and (4) of Panel C
report the results after we trim the top 5% of those with high “Potential Medigap Expenditure.”
Again, the coeﬃcients are smaller in magnitude, but the qualitative results are the same.
8.1.4 Accounting for Dynamic Lock-in Incentives
As we mentioned in Section 4.2 (especially in Footnote 26), if an individual’s Medigap coverage
lapses, insurance companies may subsequently impose both coverage and pricing rules diﬀerent from
those which apply during the open enrollment period. A potential concern is that our Medigap
price controls (age polynomial, gender and state of residence) do not reﬂect the prices faced by
those who let their coverage lapse. In this case, our ﬁnding that expenditures for those with
Medigap are about $4,000 less than for those without may, to some extent, reﬂect the following
possibility: those without Medigap are less healthy because their coverage previously lapsed and,
moreover, are currently priced out of Medigap due to their poor health. We argue here, however,
that if this mechanism is inﬂuencing our estimates its eﬀect is consistent with our interpretation of
advantageous selection.
Consider the group of individuals without Medigap who are unhealthy and priced out of Medigap
because of a lapse in their coverage. One possibility is that they never purchased a Medigap policy
in the ﬁrst place. This would be consistent with our interpretation of advantageous selection: less
healthy individuals are less likely to purchase Medigap during open enrollment (when everyone is
approximately the same age and thus state and gender controls alone would be suﬃcient to control
for Medigap pricing). The second possibility is that those without Medigap did purchase a policy
during open enrollment, but subsequently failed to renew. The standard adverse selection model
with one dimensional private information about risk suggests that less healthy people should be
more likely to renew, just as they should be more likely to enroll in the ﬁrst place. If, in contrast,
less healthy people are less likely to renew, we would argue that this is again a form of advantageous
selection.
To further investigate the inﬂuence of age-patterns on our ﬁndings, we re-estimate the regres-
sions reported in Table 3 and 4 but allow age to interact with Medigap status (speciﬁcally we allow
for the relationship between Medigap and “Total Medical Expenditure” to depend on age and its
34square and cube).52 The estimated coeﬃcients of Medigap as a function of age are then plotted
in Figure 1. To save space we only report the results for the ﬁrst Medigap status deﬁnition (the
results for the second Medigap status deﬁnition are essentially identical). Figure 1 reveals that
without health controls, those with Medigap had less “Total Medical Expenditure” than those with
Medigap at all age levels; and with health controls, those with Medigap had more expenditure than
those with Medigap, again, at all age levels. These ﬁndings suggest that age aﬀects the magnitude
but not the presence of advantageous selection in this population.53
[Figure 1 About Here]
8.2 Robustness for the Sources of Advantageous Selection
8.2.1 Alternative Uni-dimensional Measures of Health
As in the previous subsection, here we ﬁrst show that the qualitative conclusions regarding the
sources of advantageous selection remain unchanged if we used “Potential Medigap Expenditure,”
i.e., the level of medical expenditure that is not reimbursed by Medicare as an approximation of
the expenditure risk faced by a person who has only basic Medicare coverage.
[Table 11 About Here]
Panel A of Table 11 shows the results from regressions similar to those reported in Tables 8
and 9, except that we use MCBS to impute the “Potential Medigap Expenditure” instead of “Total
Medical Expenditure” for the HRS sample.54 Similar to what we found earlier, we see evidence of
advantageous selection in row (1). However we are able to explain away the advantageous selection
by the addition of the conditioning variables.
8.2.2 Alternative Measure of Health Expenditure Risk
In Section 7, we used the variance of medical expenditures as our measure of uncertainty in ex
post health expenditures. As noted in the previous subsection, one may argue that individuals care
especially about catastrophically large medical expenses, and hence the second moment may not
52No demographic controls are included for the regression speciﬁcation with health controls.
53Understanding the eﬀects of age on the magnitude of advantageous selection is important and interesting topic
for future research.
54To save space we only report the results for Medigap deﬁnition 1. The results for Medigap deﬁnition 2 are
qualitatively similar.
35be the best measure of the relevant risk. In Panel B of Table 11, we report results from regressions
similar to those reported in Tables 8 and 9 (for Medigap status deﬁnition 1) with the exception that
we use the predicted 90/10 percentile ratio as our measure of the health expenditure risk (instead
of the predicted variance). More speciﬁcally, we use the MCBS sample, again with two diﬀerent
imputation methods similar to those described above, to run quantile regressions for 90th and 10th
quantile respectively; and then use these quantile regression coeﬃcients to predict ˆ Qj90 and ˆ Qj10
for the HRS sample; then for each observation in HRS, we construct ˆ Qj90/10 = ˆ Qj90/ ˆ Qj10 as the
measure of the medical expenditure risk, in place of [ V ARj. From the coeﬃcient estimates in Panel
B of Tables 11, it is quite clear that our qualitative results regarding the sources of advantageous
selection are robust to this alternative measure of health expenditure risk.
9 Discussion: Selection versus Moral Hazard
A challenging question of central importance in the economics of information is whether we can
distinguish selection (either adverse or advantageous) from moral hazard. Chiappori and Salani´ e’s
(2000) test for asymmetric information, for example, is not designed to discriminate between adverse
selection and moral hazard, since both can lead to a positive sign of the relationship between ex
post risk occurrence and insurance coverage.55 In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the implications of
our results in Section 6 for the issue of selection versus moral hazard. We argue that, under some
conditions, the coeﬃcient estimates on “Medigap” presented in Table 2 and 3 also provide lower
bound estimates of moral hazard (or simply, the price eﬀect) of Medigap insurance.
To see this, suppose that the true medical expenditure equation is
Ei = β0 + β1Mi + β2HO
i + β3Di + β4Ui + εi, (18)
where Ei is total medical expenditure, Mi is the “Medigap” indicator, HO
i is the observed compo-
nent of health, Di is a list of demographic controls, and Ui is an index of unobservables capturing
both unobservable components of health and preferences for medical service. Assume that residual,
εi, is uncorrelated with the independent variables.
In this equation β1 will be the true measure of the moral hazard (or price) eﬀect, because we
55Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) and Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman and Pinquet (2003) propose using
dynamic insurance data to discriminate between selection and moral hazard. The idea is that, in dynamic automobile
insurance contracts where experience rating is an important feature, adverse selection will lead to positive, while moral
hazard will lead to negative, serial correlation in accident probabilities. Thus dynamic insurance data may enable
researchers to qualitatively discriminate adverse selection from moral hazard.
36are assuming that the observed health HO and the unobserved U jointly control for the true health
and taste for medical services, thus eliminating selection issues. The problem, however, is that
Ui, which contains unobserved components of health and preferences for medical service, cannot
actually be included.
The regressions we reported in Tables 2 and 3 are of the form:
Ei = ˜ β0 + ˜ β1Mi + ˜ β2HO
i + ˜ β3Di + ˜ εi, (19)
which diﬀers from (18) because we only control for the observable component of health HO
i and not
Ui. Thus, ˜ β1 is biased as an estimator of β1 because of the omission of Ui. As is well-known, the
degree of omitted variable bias can be calculated if we run an auxiliary (and imaginary) regression:56
Ui = π0 + π1Mi + π2HO
i + π3Di + µi. (20)
Then, we have that:
˜ β1 = β1 + β4π1.
If, without loss of generality, we deﬁne the unobservables in Ui to be “positives” (i.e., factors that
will lead to less medical expenditure - i.e., health and distaste for treatment), we will have by
deﬁnition β4 < 0. Then, our estimate ˜ β1 will be a lower bound of β1 – and thus a lower bound
estimate of the moral hazard (or price) eﬀect – provided that π1 ≥ 0. Note that parameter π1
measures the partial correlation between Ui and Mi conditional on observable health HO and D
(which are controls for Medigap prices). The condition π1 ≥ 0 means that U and M are positively
correlated conditional on HO and Medigap pricing.
In practice, regression (20) can never be implemented, thus it is impossible to examine whether
the condition π1 ≥ 0 is satisﬁed. There are, however, some plausible cases in which we may expect
this condition to be true. Assume that, conditional on health and demographics, tastes for medical
service are unrelated to the taste for Medigap insurance purchase. This means that the variable Ui
only contains the unobserved health component HU
i . The sign of the partial correlation between
HU
i and Mi of course depends on how people select into Medigap. There are two scenarios under
which π1 ≥ 0 will be satisﬁed:
One interesting case is where the person knows no more about his/her health than we do. This
is not unreasonable, given the that we have the person’s subjective health assessment, along with
the very extensive list of objective health measures in the MCBS/HRS. In that case, individuals
56See, e.g., Wooldridge (2006, p. 120) for an expression of the omitted-variable bias (although note that it contains
a typo).
37will make Medigap purchase decisions based only on observable health HO
i . Then π1 will be zero,
so we get a consistent estimator of the price eﬀect.
Alternatively, suppose that HU
i (some part of it) is observed by individuals when they make
Medigap purchase decisions. Then the assumption that π1 ≥ 0 amounts to assuming that selection
based on unobserved health is also advantageous. While we can never explicitly verify whether or
not this is true, it seems plausible, given the strong evidence of advantageous selection based on
observed health.57
Finally, consider a case where Ui contains only distaste for treatment. This case is diﬃcult
to analyze. In a static model, those with more distaste for health care would both demand fewer
services and, conditional on demographics and observed health, be less likely to buy Medigap, so
we get π1 < 0. The diﬃcultly arises because, in a dynamic model, it is not clear how tastes for
health care would translate into demand for services (e.g., a person who dislikes treatment would
get less preventive care, possibly leading to more required services in the long run).
10 Conclusion
In this paper we use data from the Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS) to provide
strong evidence of advantageous selection in Medigap insurance market. The ﬁrst type of evidence
comes from two sets of regressions. In the ﬁrst, we regress “Total Medical Expenditure” on Medigap
status, and only control for the determinants of price (gender, age and State of residence). We ﬁnd
that those with Medigap incur, on average, about $4,000 less in total medical expenditure than
those without Medigap. In the second set of regressions, we regress “Total Medical Expenditure”
on the determinants of price along with a rich set of controls for health status. Conditional on price
and health, we ﬁnd that those with Medigap incur about $2,000 more in medical expenditures, on
average, than those without Medigap. These two sets of results can only be reconciled if those with
better health are more likely to purchase supplemental coverage - i.e., if there is “advantageous
selection.”
We also ﬁnd direct evidence of advantageous selection by showing that “healthy” factors (i.e.
factors constructed directly from health measures) tend to be positively correlated with Medigap
coverage, while “unhealthy” factors tend to be negatively correlated with Medigap coverage. These
results are robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of Medigap status, to separating the sample into male and
57In this particular case, it is important to emphasize that whether or not the condition π1 ≥ 0 is satisﬁed is not









correlated (which is plausible when we think of H
U
i as measurement error), the condition π1 ≥ 0 can still be true.
38female subsamples. We ﬁnd that the magnitude of advantageous selection is larger for the females
than for males.
We then propose a simple empirical strategy to combine MCBS and HRS data and examine the
sources of advantageous selection. Our ﬁndings indicate that these sources include factors, such as
income, education, and planning horizons, that a rich economic model of insurance purchase would
typically accommodate. Interestingly, we ﬁnd no evidence that variation in risk preferences, which
is the primary focus of the theoretical literature on advantageous selection, explains the otherwise
negative relationship between coverage and expenditure risk. Those who are less risk tolerant buy
more insurance, but they are not particularly healthy.
But we do ﬁnd that measures of cognitive ability and ﬁnancial numeracy, which standard
economic models do not accommodate, are important sources of advantageous selection. Those
who are better able to calculate the costs and beneﬁts of investments and insurance are both
healthier, and more likely to buy the insurance. Our ﬁnding that cognitive ability is an important
source of advantageous selection is consistent with a large literature suggesting that many senior
citizens have diﬃculty understanding Medicare and Medigap beneﬁt rules. This may suggest an
important role for informational/educational interventions in this market to facilitate choice (see,
e.g., Harris (2002)).
Our ﬁndings also suggest that heterogeneity in distributions, not merely expected levels of
expenditure risk, should be included in models of asymmetric information. Speciﬁcally, we found
that diﬀerences in the variance of health expenditure, which standard models of insurance purchase
ignore, are related both to average expenditure risk and to insurance purchase. Our ﬁndings are
robust to changes in the sample and the method of imputing expected medical expenditure.
Before discussing some implications of our results, we emphasize that they are speciﬁc to the
Medigap insurance market. The heavily regulated nature of the Medigap market, as well as the
natural link to the Medicare administrative data, make it a natural testing ground for advantageous
selection. But, at the same time, these features of the Medigap market limit the generalizability of
our quantitative ﬁndings to other markets.
One interesting implication of advantageous selection is that it may oﬀer a uniﬁed explanation
for why diﬀerent insurance markets vary so much in size. We know from Akerlof (1970), Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976), and others that a severe adverse selection problem can cause an insurance
market to be small or to not even exist. But advantageous selection on dimensions of private
information other than ex post risk may counteract this eﬀect. As we will now describe, this may
explain why markets for automobile, health, home and life insurance are all large, while markets
39for annuities and long-term care insurance are quite small.58
At ﬁrst, one might suspect that institutional details can explain size diﬀerences across these
insurance markets. For example, in the U.S., automobile insurance is required by law for all vehicle
owners; health insurance is frequently provided by employers; and social security is a mandatory
annuity that crowds out private annuities. But, these explanations are not adequate for several
reasons. First, there is neither government regulation nor widespread employer provision for life
insurance in the U.S. (or in many other countries), and yet life insurance is a large and robust
market. Conversely, neither Medicare nor Medigap provide (crowd out) long term care insurance,
yet this market remains small.59 Second, for annuity markets, theoretical results by Yaari (1965)
and Davidoﬀ, Brown and Diamond (2005) show that large welfare gains can be achieved by addi-
tional annuitization even given social security. Finally, when one looks across a range of developed
countries, one notes that size diﬀerences among insurance markets are very similar, despite diﬀerent
institutional details. Thus, a more uniﬁed explanation is called for.
To illustrate how selection based on multi-dimensional private information provides a potential
uniﬁed explanation for size diﬀerences across insurance markets, it is useful to contrast the life
and annuity insurance markets. These markets cover opposite risks: life insurance covers the risk
of mortality while annuities cover the risk of longevity. In life insurance markets, the “bad risks”
from an insurer’s viewpoint are people with higher mortality probabilities. In a uni-dimensional
model, less healthy people should have a greater demand for life insurance. But, it is plausible
that more cognitively able people or those with more income also demand more life insurance,
and tend to be healthier because they invest more in their health (similar to what we ﬁnd in the
health insurance market). If these two forces roughly balance, it is possible that overall there is
no positive correlation between life insurance coverage and ex post mortality risk, as empirically
found by Cawley and Philipson (1999). Given the lack of adverse selection in the aggregate, this
market can be expected to be large.
In contrast, in an annuity insurance market, the “bad risks” from an insurer’s viewpoint are
healthy people who expect to live long lives. People with private information that they are relatively
healthy should be more likely to purchase annuities, creating an adverse selection problem. Now
lets assume, as before, that (i) more cognitively able people and those with more income are more
58See Finklestein and Poterba (2004) for some discussion about the size of annuity markets. Finkelstein and
McGarry (2005) report that only about ten percent of elderly had long-term care insurance in their data.
59Brown and Finkelstein (2004) argued that supply-side imperfections can not explain the limited size of LTC
insurance market. Note that Medicaid covers LTC once a person spends down assets to a near poverty level. Thus,
LTC insurance is best thought of as asset preservation insurance.
40likely to purchase annuities, just as they are more likely to purchase health or life insurance, and
(ii) more cognitively able people and those with more income are healthier and live longer, because
they invest more in their health. This creates an additional source of adverse selection.
Thus, while selection based on cognitive ability and income worked to alleviate the problem
of adverse selection based on health risk in the life insurance market, it works to exacerbate the
adverse selection problem in the annuity market. Similar patterns hold when we look at the other
markets we mention above (auto, health, long-term care). That is, in markets where we would
expect selection based on cognitive ability or income to exacerbate selection based on risk type,
the market is small, and vice-versa. Thus the theory of advantageous selection provides a plausible
explanation of the size diﬀerence between life, annuity and other insurance markets without relying
on institutional assumptions.60
Finally, while advantageous selection in an insurance market can cancel out the positive corre-
lation between ex post risk and insurance coverage that arises in classic adverse selection models
like Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is important to emphasize that this does not mean there is
no ineﬃciency in such a market. The policy implications of multidimensional selection models is
an important topic for future research.
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46"Medigap 1" "Medigap 2" No "Medigap" "Medigap 1" "Medigap 2" No "Medigap"
Female .606 .587 .599 .583 .554 .562
(.489) (.492) (.490) (.493) (.497) (.496)
Age 75.615 75.292 75.972 75.70 75.257 74.92
(7.105) (7.051) (8.218) (7.06) (6.956) (7.08)
Black .032 .041 .142 .029 .036 .120
(.177) (.198) (.349) (.168) (.186) (.325)
Hispanic .034 .034 .114 .013 .015 .070
(.181) (.180) (.317) (.113) (.121) (.256)
Income 32,003 33,292 20,760 23,838 29,176 19,231
(46,299) (45,067) (42,281) (31,113) (39,094) (28,687)
Married .556 .585 .424 .548 .561 .518
(.497) (.493) (.494) (.498) (.496) (.500)
Widowed .353 .327 .402 .354 .337 .347
(.478) (.469) (.490) (.478) (.473) (.476)
Divorced .054 .052 .101 .065 .066 .092
(.225) (.222) (.301) (.246) (.249) (.289)
Less than HS .253 .242 .419 .261 .236 .349
(.330) (.326) (.406) (.339) (.321) (.379)
High School .309 .299 .247 .392 .374 .336
(.462) (.458) (.432) (.488) (.484) (.472)
Some College .248 .256 .177 .187 .188 .166
(.432) (.436) (.382) (.390) (.391) (.373)
College .104 .109 .062 .081 .092 .079
(.305) (.312) (.241) (.272) (.289) (.270)
Working .146 .145 .106 .139 .138 .135
(.353) (.352) (.307) (.346) (.345) (.342)
8,362 8,413 12,646 … … …
(14,535) (14,324) (21,843)
4,761 4,665 4,533 … … …
(11,462) (11,292) (13,393)
Note: Statistics are calculated using cross section sample weights. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
Number of observations vary by variable and sample.





ReimbursementFemale .633 .532 .533
(.482) (.499) (.499)
Age 67.46 72.42 72.32
(17.21) (9.53) (9.60)
Black .209 .064 .067
(.406) (.246) (.250)
Hispanic .154 .040 .042
(.361) (.196) (.201)
Married .211 .656 .653
(.408) (.475) (.476)
Widowed .378 .239 .234
(.485) (.427) (.423)
Divorced .153 .060 .066
(.360) (.237) (.248)
Less than HS .520 .211 .214
(.438) (.303) (.306)
High School .207 .303 .327
(.405) (.460) (.469)
Some College .110 .271 .264
(.313) (.445) (.441)
College .032 .107 .095
(.177) (.309) (.293)






# Obs. 5,811 6,248 3,169
Note: Statistics are calculated using cross section sample 
weights. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Both MCBS and 





Table 2: Characteristics of Samples not Included in One of 








Medicaid(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables All Female  Male All Female  Male 
medigap -4392.7*** -6037.4*** -1863.4*** -3783.3*** -5687.4*** -1448.2***
(347.0) (456.6) (540.8) (375.4) (485.7) (569.8)
female 270.0 -263.6
(356.7) (389.5)
(age-65) 387.5*** 460.6*** 292.9 310.5** 325.1** 281.8
(138.2) (176.0) (229.3) (136.4) (169.1) (229.6)
(age-65)^2 1.94 -1.79 5.58 .94 -.744 .444
(10.65) (13.20) (18.84) (10.5) (12.7) (18.6)
(age-65)^3 .12 .17 .07 .134 .160 .143
(.22) (.27) (.43) (.220) (.262) (.422)
# of Observations 15,945 9,725 6,220 15,784 9,621 6,163
Adjusted R^2 .0702 .0873 .0531 .0869 .1089 .0680
medigap -4142.6*** -5883.1*** -1629.3*** -3457.2*** -5520*** -1297***
(323.4) (432.2) (494.9) (351.4) (470.2) (512.0)
female -35.4 -545.5*
(313.1) (338.0)
(age-65) 425.2*** 470.4*** 383.9* 333.6*** 336.8** 336.2*
(122.2) (156.3) (198.1) (120.7) (150.8) (197.3)
(age-65)^2 -4.12 -5.85 -3.37 -3.75 -4.42 -5.64
(9.55) (11.90) (16.62) (9.37) (11.5) (16.32)
(age-65)^3 .25 .26 .23 .237 .246 .250
(.21) (.25) (.39) (.201) (.240) (.379)
# of Observations 18,708 11,218 7,490 18,539 11,112 7,427
Adjusted R^2 .0638 .0830 .0442 .0787 .1024 .0588
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at individual level.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 3: OLS Regression Results of Total Medical Expenditure on "Medigap" Coverage in MCBS, with 
No Health Controls
Other demographics included are race, education, marital status, income, working and number of children.
Panel A: First "Medigap" Definition
Panel B: Second "Medigap" Definition
Note: The Dependent variable is "Total Medical Expenditure." All regressions are weighted by the cross section 
sample weight. See text and Data Appendix for the two definitions of Medigap.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables All Female  Male All Female  Male 
medigap 1937.0*** 1677.3*** 2420.9*** 1732.8*** 1426.2*** 2210.1***
(257.6) (349.0) (397.4) (272.4) (358.4) (418.9)
female -751.6*** -754.1***
(283.7) (294.0)
(age-65) 394.5*** 417.5*** 355.4* 419.6*** 444.2*** 392.1**
(117.4) (145.0) (197.6) (113.3) (137.4) (198.9)
(age-65)^2 -27.5*** -32.0*** -22.8 -28.3*** -32.7*** -25.2
(9.3) (11.4) (16.3) (9.0) (11.1) (16.4)
(age-65)^3 .474** .548** .466 .491** .562** .520
(.207) (.254) (.380) (.202) (.247) (.382)
# of Observations 14,129 8,371 5,758 14,105 8,365 5,740
Adjusted R^2 .2087 .1915 .2462 .2135 .2007 .2484
medigap 1967.3*** 1638.5*** 2529.7*** 1760.2*** 1372.5*** 2353.1***
(238.7) (311.5) (377.4) (255.9) (330.0) (398.3)
female -926.1*** -911.9***
(264.0) (275.7)
(age-65) 371.6*** 404.5*** 371.8** 384.3*** 417.5*** 392.6**
(104.1) (129.2) (171.1) (101.8) (124.0) (172.0)
(age-65)^2 -25.6*** -30.2*** -24.8* -25.6*** -30.3*** -26.3*
(8.3) (10.2) (14.1) (8.1) (9.9) (14.1)
(age-65)^3 .418*** .504** .479 .420** .506** .520
(.185) (.227) (.330) (.182) (.222) (.331)
# of Observations 16,885 9,860 7,025 16,853 9,852 7,001
Adjusted R^2 .2001 .1906 .2342 .2042 .1991 .2362
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at individual level.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
The variables included as direct health controls are detailed in Data Appendix. The other demographics included 
are race, education, marital status, income, working and number of children.
Table 4: OLS Regression Results of Total Medical Expenditure on "Medigap" Coverage in MCBS, with 
Direct Health Controls
Panel A: First "Medigap" Definition
Panel B: Second "Medigap" Definition
Note: The Dependent variable is "Total Medical Expenditure." All regressions are weighted by the cross section 
sample weight. See text and Data Appendix for the two definitions of Medigap.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables All Female  Male All Female  Male 
medigap 2083.3*** 1601.1*** 2775.5*** 1838.7*** 1347.5*** 2450.0***
(280.6) (353.8) (426.3) (293.0) (361.7) (453.5)
female -1311.2*** -1274.4***
(271.5) (285.4)
(age-65) 421.8*** 447.6*** 436.0** 433.5*** 467.8*** 451.6**
(118.7) (151.5) (194.2) (116.9) (144.2) (196.6)
(age-65)^2 -28.7*** -32.6*** -27.3* -28.6*** -32.3*** -26.7*
(9.2) (11.9) (16.0) (9.1) (11.6) (16.2)
(age-65)^3 .479** .534** .543 .481** .513** .520
(.205) (.261) (.375) (.201) (.255) (.381)
Factor1 321.0 -410.7*** 1097.1* 324.9 -415.5*** 1094.5*
(498.0) (89.0) (658.7) (495.1) (90.3) (662.0)
Factor2 4917.5*** 4902.2*** 4880.6*** 4928.9*** 4976.5*** 4855.9***
(268.3) (343.2) (368.4) (269.3) (349.4) (357.9)
Factor3 -2979.4*** -2500.8*** -4048.4*** -3055.1*** -2449.8*** -4211.7***
(306.2) (300.7) (623.9) (308.0) (307.7) (605.5)
Factor4 -652.1** -684.3* -1073.5 -746.3** -794.9** -1141.8
(311.1) (384.3) (911.2) (309.7) (381.2) (895.8)
Factor5 75.8 436.4* -2278.9* 28.7* 459.3* -2294.7*
(305.0) (253.8) (1340.1) (309.8) (252.8) (1308.9)
# of Observations 14,129 8,371 5,758 14,105 8,337 5,731
Adjusted R^2 .1398 .1345 .1792 .1448 .1450 .1857
medigap 2154.5*** 1577.6*** 2944.7*** 1914.2*** 1312.0*** 2628.6***
(256.7) (321.1) (412.7) (207.8) (338.0) (426.4)
female -1468.5*** -1435.7***
(249.1) (261.3)
(age-65) 433.1*** 442.3*** 421.8*** 434.9*** 452.4*** 414.9***
(105.0) (134.7) (168.2) (103.9) (129.6) (170.6)
(age-65)^2 -29.2*** -31.6*** -27.1** -28.5*** -31.1*** -25.2*
(8.2) (10.6) (13.7) (8.1) (10.4) (13.8)
(age-65)^3 .468*** .508** .484 .461* .489** .437
(.184) (.234) (.322) (.181) (.230) (.325)
Factor1 147.6 -843.9*** 847.2 144.3 -865.8*** 878.8
(422.3) (88.3) (767.3) (420.1) (89.0) (808.3)
Factor2 4908.8*** 4743.5*** 4982.6*** 4918.5*** 4820.0*** 4970.3***
(246.2) (310.0) (360.9) (247.6) (316.7) (356.9)
Factor3 -2949.4*** -2578.1*** -3560.8*** -3008.7*** -2537.1*** -3701.8***
(265.3) (264.4) (515.9) (266.5) (269.2) (518.7)
Factor4 -435.3 -689.7** 181.3 -510.9* -771.5** 216.9
(266.3) (333.7) (453.0) (265.8) (331.3) (458.2)
Factor5 182.9 408.2* -153.0 140.4 425.2* -184.0
(267.5) (229.2) (409.4) (271.7) (227.9) (408.4)
# of Observations 16,885 9,860 7,025 16,853 9,822 6991
Adjusted R^2 .1401 .1357 .1548 .1447 .1451 .1605
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard error in parenthesis are clustered at individual level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.
The variables included as direct health controls are detailed in Data Appendix. The other demographics included are 
race, education, marital status, income, working and number of children.
Table 5: OLS Regression Results of Total Medical Expenditure on "Medigap" Coverage in MCBS, with 
Controls for Health Factors
Panel A: First "Medigap" Definition
Note: The Dependent variable is "Total Medical Expenditure." All regressions are weighted by the cross section 
sample weight. See text and Data Appendix for the two definitions of Medigap.
Panel B: Second "Medigap" DefinitionEXP PCORR EXP PCORR EXP PCORR EXP PCORR EXP PCORR EXP PCORR
Factor1 321.0 .0296 -410.7*** .0274 1097.1* .0342 147.6 .0269 -843.9*** .0373 847.2 .0267
(.000) (.012) (.009) (.000) (.000) (.025)
Factor2 4917.5*** -.1166 4902.2*** -.1290 4880.6*** -.0978 4908.8*** -.1107 4743.5*** -.1193 4982.6*** -.0953
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Factor3 -2979.4*** .0319 -2500.8*** .0425 -4048.4*** .0200 -2949.4*** .0297 -2578.1*** .0434 -3560.8*** .0138
(.000) (.000) (.129) (.000) (.000) (.247)
Factor4 -652.1** -.0177 -684.3* -.0171 -1073.5 .0229 -435.3 -.0186 -689.7** -.0157 181.3 -.0389
(.035) (.117) (.083) (.016) (.120) (.001)
Factor5 75.8 .0207 436.4* .0143 -2278.9* -.0204 182.9 .0333 408.2* .0258 -153.0 .0262
(.014) (.190) (.122) (.015) (.010) (.028)
# of Obs. 14,131 8,373 5,758 16,887 9,862 7,025
Note: The columns labelled with "EXP" are the regression coefficients from Table 3 for the specification with other demographic controls. They are included in 
the table for the interpretation of the factors.
The columns labelled with "PORR" lists the partial correlation of "medigap" with the corresponding factors. The number in parenthesis is the significance level of 
the correlation.
All Female Male
Table 6: Partial Correlation between "Medigap" Coverage and Health Factors in MCBS, Conditional on Gender and Age
Panel A: First "Medigap" Definition
Male All Female
Panel B: Second "Medigap" Definition
FactorsAll Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male
Female 0.602 1.000 .000 .572 1.000 .000 .593 1.000 .000 .558 1.000 .000
(.489) (.000) (.000) (.495) (.000) (.000) (.491) (.000) (.000) (.497) (.000) (.000)
Age 75.808 76.546 74.690 75.301 75.847 74.415 75.602 76.336 74.534 75.112 75.672 74.263
(7.729) (8.047) (7.076) (7.078) (7.353) (6.611) (7.612) (7.933) (6.983) (7.010) (7.295) (6.547)
Medigap .459 .462 .455 .486 .495 .473 .545 .540 .552 .568 .565 .573
(.498) (.495) (.498) (.500) (.500) (.499) (.498) (.498) (.497) (.495) (.496) (.495)
Medicare_AB .958 .966 .945 .949 .947 .953 .955 .965 .940 .948 .947 .949
(.201) (.181) (.228) (.219) (.223) (.213) (.208) (.185) (.237) (.223) (.224) (.220)
Black .091 .094 .087 .076 .082 .069 .087 .090 .082 .072 .078 .065
(.288) (.293) (.282) (.265) (.274) (.253) (.281) (.286) (.275) (.259) (.269) (.246)
Hispanic .077 .073 .082 .042 .040 .046 .070 .067 .074 .039 .036 .042
(.266) (.261) (.275) (.202) (.195) (.211) (.255) (.251) (.261) (.193) (.188) (.200)
Married .485 .344 .698 .532 .391 .743 .512 .371 .717 .543 .390 .755
(.500) (.475) (.459) (.499) (.488) (.437) (.500) (.483) (.451) (.498) (.488) (.430)
Widowed .379 .523 .162 .350 .481 .151 .361 .504 .153 .342 .478 .146
(.485) (.499) (.368) (.477) (.500) (.358) (.480) (.500) (.360) (.474) (.500) (.353)
Divorced .079 .084 .071 .079 .092 .063 .074 .079 .068 .077 .092 .060
(.270) (.287) (.258) (.269) (.289) (.244) (.262) (.269) (.252) (.267) (.290) (.238)
# of children 2.998 2.912 3.127 3.193 3.134 3.283 2.978 2.890 3.106 3.163 3.093 3.263
(2.238) (2.224) (2.252) (2.228) (2.227) (2.238) (2.187) (2.177) (2.194) (2.193) (2.198) (2.193)
Working .124 .088 .179 .137 .118 .165 .127 .091 .180 .137 .118 .163
(.330) (.284) (.383) (.344) (.323) (.371) (.333) (.287) (.385) (.344) (.322) (.369)
Less than HS .343 .342 .345 .306 .306 .307 .323 .322 .323 .285 .287 .280
(.377) (.375) (.384) (.360) (.362) (.361) (.368) (.367) (.368) (.348) (.350) (.347)
High School .276 .300 .240 .363 .387 .329 .276 .300 .240 .357 .382 .324
(.447) (.458) (.427) (.481) (.487) (.470) (.447) (.458) (.427) (.479) (.486) (.468)
Some College .210 .217 .198 .177 .183 .169 .220 .227 .209 .179 .186 .170
(.407) (.413) (.399) (.381) (.386) (.375) (.414) (.419) (.406) (.383) (.389) (.376)
College .081 .068 .101 .080 .065 .099 .088 .074 .108 .086 .070 .107
(.273) (.252) (.301) (.271) (.247) (.299) (.283) (.261) (.310) (.281) (.255) (.309)
Note: Statistics are calculated using cross section sample weights. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Number of observations vary by variable 
and sample.
Table 7: Descripitive Statistics of MCBS and HRS Samples
MCBS HRS
Panel B: Second Definition of Medigap Panel A: First Definition of Medigap











(1) -.0391 (.000) -.0558 (.001) -.0574 (.116) N N N N N N N N 9973
(2) … -.0558 (.001) -.0570 (.118) Y N N N N N N N 3467
(3) … -.0301 (.162) .0393 (.121) Y Y Y N N N N N 3467
(4) … -.0234 (.281) .0508 (.063) Y Y Y Y N N N N 3467
(5) … -.0039 (.843) .0636 (.060) Y Y Y Y Y N N N 3467
(6) … … .0758 (.049) Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 1696
(7) … … .0781 (.055) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 1695
(8) … … .0783 (.061) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 1659
(9) -.0534 (.000) -.0754 (.000) -.0776 (.022) N N N N N N N N 11866
(10) … -.0754 (.000) -.0771 (.022) Y N N N N N N N 4295
(11) … -.0405 (.060) .0224 (.398) Y Y Y N N N N N 4295
(12) … -.0273 (.212) .0444 (.130) Y Y Y Y N N N N 4295
(13) … -.0069 (.726) .0560 (.121) Y Y Y Y Y N N N 4295
(14) … … .0683 (.087) Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 2146
(15) … … .0694 (.089) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 2143
(16) … … .0709 (.093) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 2103
Note: p-value in parenthesis. All regressions include controls for female, a third order polynomial in age-65 and State.
Panel B: Second Definition of Medigap
Panel A: First Definition of Medigap
Table 8: Sources of Advantageous Selection: Predicting Medical Expenditure Using Only MCBS No Medigap Observations













(1) -.0275 (.004) -.0519 (.002) -.0465 (.167) N N N N N N N N 9973
(2) … -.0519 (.002) -.0461 (.169) Y N N N N N N N 3467
(3) … -.0296 (.173) .0263 (.307) Y Y Y N N N N N 3467
(4) … -.0222 (.313) .0380 (.133) Y Y Y Y N N N N 3467
(5) … -.0034 (.862) .0490 (.091) Y Y Y Y Y N N N 3467
(6) … … .0562 (.068) Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 1696
(7) … … .0580 (.074) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 1695
(8) … … .0587 (.080) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 1659
(9) -.0429 (.000) -.0776 (.000) -.0832 (.005) N N N N N N N N 11866
(10) … -.0777 (.000) -.0827 (.005) Y N N N N N N N 4295
(11) … -.0026 (.956) -.0284 (.705) Y Y Y N N N N N 4295
(12) … .0176 (.695) .0140 (.853) Y Y Y Y N N N N 4295
(13) … .0490 (.262) .0483 (.518) Y Y Y Y Y N N N 4295
(14) … … .0567 (.438) Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 2146
(15) … … .0618 (.402) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 2143
(16) … … .0695 (.346) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 2103
Note: p-value in parenthesis. All regressions include controls for female, a third order polynomial in age-65 and State.
Panel B: Second Definition of Medigap
Table 9: Sources of Advantageous Selection: Predicting Medical Expenditure Using All Observations in MCBS
Conditioning Variables
Panel A: First Definition of Medigap
Coefficient Estimate of Pred. Exp./10,000(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medigap 1 Medigap 2 Medigap 1 Medigap 2
(1) -4392.7*** -4142.6*** -4,454*** -4,175***
(347.0) (323.4) (202.2) (192.9)
(2) 1937.0*** 1967.3*** 80.4 219.7*
(257.6) (238.7) (132.1) (125.3)
(1) -4,418.5*** -4210.8*** -3996.8*** -3,788.4***
(364.8) (345.6) (298.7) (308.1)
(2) 1,899.6*** 1927.9*** 2011.3*** 2108.5***
(276.6) (254.7) (276.6) (278.5)
(1) -1,400*** -939*** -1,103*** -559.6***
(183.1) (162.9) (94.4) (81.0)
(2) 1,673*** 1,775*** 247.7*** 446.3***
(147.8) (130.9) (73.8) (66.9)
Dropped From Sample
Total Medical Expenditure Potential "Medigap" Expenditure
Robust standard error in parenthesis are clustered at individual level. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Note: All regressions are weighted by the cross section sample weight. See text and Data 
Appendix for the two definitions of Medigap.
Rows labelled as (1) report the Medigap coefficients from regression specifications that are the 
same as column (1) in Table 3, with only controls for variables that determine price. Rows 
labelled as (2) report the Medigap coefficients from specifications that are the same as column 
(1) of Table 4, which include direct health controls detailed in Data Appendix.
Table 10: Robustness of the Evidence of Advantageous Selection: "Medigap" 
Coefficients
Panel A: Alternative Measures of Health Expenditure Risk
Panel B: Alternative Treatment of Medicare HMO
Panel C: Trimming Top 5% of the Observations
Total Medical Expenditure Potential "Medigap" Expenditure
Treated As MedigapAB C A B C
(1) -.0420 (.001) -.062 (.001) -.0614 (.109) -.0398 (.003) -.0591 (.003) -.0527 (.148)
(2) … -.0618 (.003) -.0607 (.111) … -.0578 (.004) -.0506 (.166)
(3) … -.0421 (.201) .0423 (.106) … -.0368 (.182) .0297 (.311)
(4) … -.0286 (.302) .0579 (.056) … -.0264 (.298) .0361 (.124)
(5) … -.0042 (.901) .0665 (.059) … -.0037 (.914) .0429 (.094)
(6) … … .0792 (.043) … … .0556 (.062)
(7) … … .0797 (.051) … … .0588 (.064)
(8) … … .0802 (.057) … … .0647 (.065)
(1) -.0391 (.000) -.0558 (.001) -.0574 (.116) -.0275 (.004) -.0519 (.002) -.0465 (.167)
(2) … -.0558 (.001) -.0570 (.118) … -.0519 (.002) -.0461 (.169)
(3) … -.0381 (.196) .0338 (.133) … -.0317 (.186) .0249 (.324)
(4) … -.0275 (.297) .0525 (.067) … -.0237 (.308) .0377 (.142)
(5) … -.0048 (.784) .0619 (.061) … -.0035 (.856) .0489 (.094)
(6) … … .0749 (.051) … … .0562 (.069)
(7) … … .0769 (.054) … … .0579 (.077)
(8) … … .0769 (.059) … … .0584 (.085)
Note: The included conditioning variables in each row are the same as those in the corresponding rows in Table 
8 and 9. The columns A, B and C differ in their sample size. See text for explanations. 
p-value in parenthesis. All regressions include controls for female, a third order polynomial in age-65 and State.
Imputation Method 1 Imputation Method 2
Panel B: Q90/Q10 As Measure of Expenditure Variation
Panel A: Potential "Medigap" Expenditure as a Measure of Health Risk
Table 11: Robustness of Sources of Advantageous Selection: Coefficient Estimate of Pred. Exp./10,000 
(First Definition of Medigap)








65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
With No Health Control With Health Control DifferenceCategory Variable Data
Health Total expendidure MCBS Total annual health care expenditure for 12 months of the survey year.  Expenditure includes data
expenditure from Medicare administrative files and survey responses for out-of-pocket and otherwise insured
expenditures.
Insurance
medicare Indicators for whether the respondent is covered by medicare part A and part B.
medigap MCBS Indicator for whether repsondent, with medicare coverage also has self-purchased private health
insurance. Those covered by employer provided health inurance, medicaid or VA Champus 
(Tri-care) are treated as missing. 
HRS Indicator for whether respondent, with Medicare coverage also has private health insurance that is
secondary to Medicare, and not purchased from a (spouse's) employer or union. Those covered by 
employer provided health inurance, medicaid or VA Champus (Tri-care) are treated as missing.
medigap2 Variable equal to one if medigap is equal to one, or if covered by employer sponsored health
insurance and pay more than $500 per year in premiums.
Demographics race Indicators for self-reported black, other and non-response
hispanic Indicators for self-reported hispanic and non-response
education Indicators for highest grade completed less than 8th grade, some high school, high school graduate, 
some college, college graduate, at least some grad school and non-response
marital status Indicators for maried, widowed, divorced, separated and non-response
number of children The number of children the respondent has ever had.
income MCBS Indicators for self-reported total household income in $5,000 intervals from $5,000 to $50,000,
and $50,000 plus
HRS Same indicators as above, except in this case we use reported as well as imputed values for total
household income. Imputations are those generated by RAND. 
See http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/meta/rand/randhrse/randhrse.pdf for details of the imputation.
work status Indicators if currently working for pay and for non-response.
Description
DATA APPENDIXCategory Variable Data
Health Self-reported Indicators for self-reported health excellent, very good, good, and fair. 
Height Self-reported height, in inches, and height squared.
Body mass index Self-reported (weight (kg) ) / (height (m) squared )
Ever a smoker Indicator if respondent has "ever smoked" tobacco
Current smoker Indicator if respondent now smokes tobacco, and for non-response
Diagnoses Indicators for if a doctor has ever told the respondent he/she has: arthritis, high blood pressure, 
diabetes, (non-skin) cancer, lung disease, heart attack, chronic heart disease, stroke, 
psychiatric illness, Alzheimer's disease, broken hip and for each diagnosis, non-response.
Treatments Indicators for respondent ever having cataract surgery or a hearing aid
(Instrumental)  Indicators for if a respondent has at least some difficulty walking 2-3 blocks, stooping, reaching
activities of overhead, lifting 10lbs, dressing, walking at all, bathing, eating, getting out of a chair, using the toilet,
daily living preparing meals, shopping, using the telephone, managing money and bills, and for non-response.
Help with IADS Indicators for if a respondent receives help dressing, walking at all, bathing, eating, getting out of 
a chair, using the toilet, preparing a meal shopping, using the telephone or managing money and bills
and for non-response.
Risk attitudes Risk Tolerance HRS Estimate of risk tolerance from Kimball, Salm and Shapiro (2004), using responses to hypothetical
income gambles from 1992 and 1994.
Cognition Word recall HRS Variables recording the number of words recalled from a list of 10, both immediately after the list was
read and several minutes later.
TICS Score HRS Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status. Number of correct answers on a test of knowledge, language
and orientation. Questions include naming objects, vocabulary questions, and basic knowledge such 
as the U.S. President's name.
Subtraction HRS Number of times respondent can subtract the number 7 sequentially, starting from 100.
Numeracy HRS Number of correct answers to "word problems" of division and multiplication on topics of probability, compound
interest, and division of assets. Asked only in 2002.
Expectations Longevity HRS Most recent answer to the question "What is the percent chance you will live to 75 or more"
Planning Financial HRS Indicators for whether the respondents most important period for planning saving and spending is
Horizon the next few months, the next year, the next few years, the next five to ten years, or more than 10 years. 
Description